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EMPIRICAL  models of business investment  rely generally  on the assump- 
tion of a "representative  firm"  that  responds  to prices set in centralized 
securities markets. Indeed, if all firms have equal access to capital 
markets,  firms'  responses to changes in the cost of capital  or tax-based 
investment  incentives differ only because of differences  in investment 
demand.  A firm's  financial  structure  is irrelevant  to investment  because 
external  funds  provide  a perfect  substitute  for  internal  capital.  In  general, 
with perfect  capital  markets,  a firm's  investment  decisions are indepen- 
dent of its financial  condition. 
An alternative  research  agenda,  however, has been based  on the view 
that internal  and external  capital  are not perfect substitutes.  According 
to this view, investment may depend on financial  factors, such as the 
availability  of internal  finance, access to new debt or equity finance, or 
the functioning of particular  credit markets. For example, a firm's 
internal  cash flow may affect investment  spending  because of a "financ- 
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ing hierarchy"  in which internal  funds have a cost advantage  over new 
debt or equity finance. Under these circumstances, firms' investment 
and  financing  decisions are interdependent. 
In this  article,  we link  conventional  models  of investment  to the recent 
literature  on capital  market  imperfections  and disparities  in the access 
of individual  firms  to capital  markets.  Conventional  representative  firm 
models in which financial structure is  irrelevant to the investment 
decision may well apply to mature  companies with well-known pros- 
pects. For other  firms,  however, financial  factors  appear  to matter  in the 
sense that external  capital  is not a perfect substitute  for internal  funds, 
particularly  in the short run. To provide a foundation for such an 
"imperfection," we appeal to problems in capital markets, especially 
asymmetric  information,  that make it very costly, even impossible, for 
providers  of external  finance  to evaluate  the quality  of firms'  investment 
opportunities.  As a result, the cost of new debt and equity may differ 
substantially  from the opportunity  cost of internal  finance generated 
through  cash flow and  retained  earnings. 
We begin by reviewing the role of financial  factors in investment 
studies. We then document  differences  in financing  patterns  by size of 
firms  and consider a variety of explanations  why internal  and external 
finance are not perfect substitutes. We use manufacturing  firm  data to 
analyze differences  in investment in firms  classified according  to their 
earnings  retention  practices.  If the cost disadvantage  of external  finance 
is small, retention  practices  should  reveal little or nothing  about  invest- 
ment: firms  will simply use external  funds to smooth investment  when 
internal  finance  fluctuates,  regardless  of their  dividend  policy. If the cost 
disadvantage  is significant,  firms that retain and invest most of their 
income may have no low-cost source of investment finance, and their 
investment  should  be driven  by fluctuations  in cash flow. 
We present tests of this hypothesis for the q,  neoclassical, and 
accelerator  models of investment.  In each case, the investment  of firms 
that exhaust  all their  internal  finance  is more sensitive to fluctuations  in 
cash flow than that of mature, high-dividend  firms. We also find a 
difference  across firms  in the sensitivity of investment  to balance sheet 
variables that measure liquidity. Financial effects on investment are 
greatest  at times when capital  market  information  problems  are  likely to 
be most severe for high-retention  firms, a finding  that reinforces our 
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We test the robustness  of these results to a wide variety of changes in 
estimation  techniques  and specifications. 
We conclude  by discussing  the implications  of our  findings.  For firms 
that face financing constraints, investment may be sensitive to the 
average  tax burden  as well as to marginal  tax rates. Our  results  may  also 
shed light on problems in industrial organization, such as financial 
motivations for conglomerate  mergers. Finally, while capital market 
information  problems  arise at the level of the firm,  financial  constraints 
have a clear macroeconomic  dimension because fluctuations  in firms' 
cash flow and liquidity  are correlated  with movements  of the aggregate 
economy over the business cycle. To the extent that  a significant  subset 
of firms faces financing  constraints, their behavior may help explain 
aggregate  movements  of investment,  and conclusions from  models that 
maintain  the representative  firm  assumption  must be reexamined. 
Finance and the Study of Investment 
Early investment research, especially the work of John Meyer and 
Edwin Kuh, emphasized  the importance  of financial  considerations  in 
business investment.  I Indeed, financial  effects on many aspects of real 
economic activity received broad attention during  the early postwar 
period.2  Most research since the middle 1960s, however, has isolated 
real  firm  decisions from  purely  financial  factors. Franco  Modigliani  and 
Merton Miller provided the theoretical basis for that approach by 
l.  John R. Meyer  and Edwin  Kub,  Thle  Investment  Decision:  An Empirical  Studv 
(Harvard  University  Press, 1957).  Other  contributions  associated  with  the "Charles  River 
School" of investment  include James S. Duesenberry,  Butsiness Cycles  anCd  Economic 
Growth  (McGraw-Hill,  1958);  Kuh and Meyer, "Investment,  Liquidity,  and Monetary 
Policy," in Commission  on Money and C.redit, Impacts of Monetary  Policy (Prentice 
Hall, 1963), pp. 339-474; and Meyer and Robert R. Glauber,  Investm-nent  Deci.sions, 
Economnic Forecasting,  and Public  Policy  (Division  of  Research,  Graduate School  of 
Business  Administration,  Harvard  University, 1964). 
2. The  influence  of financial  factors  in real  activity  is provided  by the "debt  deflation" 
school associated with Irving  Fisher, Hyman Minsky, and Charles  Kindleberger.  See 
Irving  Fisher, "The  Debt-Deflation  Theory  of Great  Depressions,"  Econometrica,  vol. 1 
(October  1933),  pp. 337-57;  Hyman  P. Minsky,  John  Maynard  Keynes  (Columbia  Univer- 
sity Press, 1975);  Charles  Kindleberger,  Manias,  Panics and  Crashes  (Basic  Books, 1978). 
For the role of firm  financial  capacity  in the credit intermediation  process, see John G. 
Gurley and E. S. Shaw, "Financial  Aspects of Economic Development," American 
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demonstrating  the irrelevance  of financial  structure  and  financial  policy 
for real  investment  under  certain  conditions.3  Their  key insight  was that 
a firm's financial structure  will not affect its market value in perfect 
capital  markets.  Thus, if the Modigliani-Miller  assumptions  are  satisfied, 
real firm decisions, motivated by the maximization  of shareholders' 
claimns,  are independent  of financial  factors such as internal  liquidity, 
debt leverage, or dividend  payments. 
Applied to capital investment, this general  finding  provided  a foun- 
dation for the neoclassical theory of investment developed by Dale 
Jorgenson and others, in which the firm's intertemporal  optimization 
problem  could be solved without reference to financial  factors.4  Firms 
were assumed to face a cost of capital, set in centralized securities 
markets,  that  did not depend  on the firm's  particular  financial  structure. 
Since the development  of the neoclassical  theory, much  empirical  work, 
with both aggregate  and  firm-level  data, has been devoted to tests of the 
relative success of various investment demand  models, often without 
reference  to the possible influence  of financial  factors. 
Using data on 15 large manufacturing  firms, Jorgenson  and Calvin 
Siebert  found  the neoclassical  model superior  to internal  funds theories 
of investment.  Apart  from their  results, they preferred  the neoclassical 
theory because it was consistent with the Modigliani-Miller  finding  that 
firm  financial  policy is irrelevant  for investment.  However, with a larger 
sample  of 184  firms,  J. W. Elliott reversed the Jorgenson-Siebert  rank- 
ings, assigning  the best ranking  to the liquidity  model.5 
Subsequent  comparative  studies  of investment  demand  models using 
aggregate  time series data ranked alternative specifications  based on 
statistical  prediction  error  or goodness of fit. As an econometric  issue, 
it is not obvious why these criteria are appropriate  for comparative 
3. Franco  Modigliani  and  Merton  H. Miller,  "The  Cost  of Capital,  Corporation  Finance 
and  the Theory  of Investment,"  American Economic Review, vol. 48 (June  1958),  pp. 261- 
97;  Merton  H. Miller  and  Franco  Modigliani,  "Dividend  Policy,  Growth,  and  the  Valuation 
of Shares,"  .Journal of BusineNs, vol. 34 (October  1961),  pp. 411-33. 
4. The neoclassical  model  is outlined  in Robert  E. Hall  and  Dale W. Jorgenson,  "Tax 
Policy and Investment Behavior," American  Economic  Review,  vol. 57 (June 1967), 
pp. 391-414. 
5. Dale W. Jorgenson  and  Calvin  D. Siebert,  "A Comparison  of Alternative  Theories 
of Corporate  Investment  Behavior,"  Amlerican Economic  Review,  vol. 58 (September 
1968),  pp. 681-712;  J. W. Elliott.  "Theories  of Corporate  Investment  Behavior  Revisited," 
Americaz  Economic Review, vol. 63 (March  1973),  pp. 195-207. Steven  M. Fazzari,  R.  Glenn Hubbard,  and Bruce C. Petersen  145 
analysis. Moreover,  with formal  nonnested  specification  tests of invest- 
ment models estimated  from quarterly  time series data, and accounting 
for  first-order  serial  correlation  of the residuals,  Ben Bernanke,  Henning 
Bohn, and Peter Reiss find  that all of the standard  models are rejected 
by at least one other  model.6 
Apart from econometric issues,  the assumption of representative 
firms  is common  to all this research-that is, the same empirical  model 
applies  to all firms  regardless  of the specification.  Therefore,  tests could 
not ascertain  whether  the observed empirical  sensitivity of investment 
to financial variables differed in different kinds of firms.7  Thus, the 
representative  firm paradigm  limited the explanations that could be 
provided  for financial  effects. 
The empirical work in this article relates the traditional  study of 
financial  effects on investment to recent literature  on capital market 
imperfections  by studying  investment  behavior  in groups  of firms  with 
different  financial  characteristics.8  This change in empirical  technique 
may help explain some aspects of the empirical  paradoxes evident in 
past investment studies. If only certain classes of firms face capital 
market  imperfections  and corresponding  financial  constraints,  the find- 
ing of Elliott, for example, that financial  effects for a comparatively 
6. For comparative  studies, see Charles  W. Bischoff, "Business Investment  in the 
1970s:  A Comparison  of Models," BPEA, 1:1971,  pp. 13-58;  Richard  W. Kopcke, "The 
Behavior  of Investment  Spending  during  the Recession and Recovery, 1973-76," New 
England Economic Review (November-December 1977), pp. 5-41; Peter K.  Clark, 
"Investment  in the 1970s:  Theory,  Performance,  and  Prediction,"  BPEA,  1:1979,  pp. 73- 
113; Ben Bernanke, Henning Bohn, and Peter C. Reiss,  "Alternative Non-Nested 
Specification  Tests of Time-Series  Investment  Models,"  Journal  of Econometrics,  vol. 37 
(March,  1988). 
7. Robert Eisner's extensive study of firm-level  data provides an exception to the 
typical  assumption  of representative  firms.  Eisner  found  that  the timing  of investment  in 
small  firms  is more sensitive  to profits  than  it is in large  firms.  Robert  Eisner,  Factors in 
Business Investment (Ballinger Press,  1978). 
8. Much  recent work has studied  general  financial  effects on real  economic activity. 
See Mark  Gertler,  "Financial  Structure  and  Aggregate  Economic  Activity:  An  Overview,  " 
Journal of Money,  Credit and Banking, forthcoming; Alan S. Blinder, "Credit Rationing 
and Effective Supply Failures," Economic Journal, vol. 97 (June 1987), pp. 327-52; 
Charles  W. Calomiris  and  R. Glenn  Hubbard,  "Price  Flexibility,  Credit  Availability,  and 
Economic Fluctuations:  Evidence from the United States, 1879-1914"  (Northwestern 
University,  1987);  Ben S. Bernanke,  "Nonmonetary  Effects of the Financial  Crisis  in the 
Propagation  of the Great  Depression,"  American  Economic  Review, vol. 73 (June  1983), 
pp. 257-76;  Charles  W. Calomiris,  R. Glenn  Hubbard,  and James  H. Stock, "The Farm 
Debt Crisis  and  Public  Policy," BPEA,  2:1986,  pp. 441-79. 146  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1988 
broad  sample  of firms  are significant  need not conflict  with the findings 
of Jorgenson and Siebert that a model emphasizing  only real factors 
explains investment better for a group of well-known, mature firms. 
Both empirical approaches are appropriate  in certain contexts. The 
problem,  common  to both, is the use of the representative  firm  assump- 
tion to explain  investment  for all firms.  Therefore,  the issue need not be 
posed as whether  firm  financial  conditions "matter"  for investment  in 
some aggregate  sense, or whether  models of investment  that  emphasize 
financial  variables  fit the aggregate  data better or forecast better than 
models that include  only real variables. 
Sources and Cost of Finance 
As information  on their  sources  and  uses of funds  shows, the financing 
practices of U.S. firms  vary widely.9  Table 1 summarizes  the financing 
practices of manufacturing  firms  during  1970-84, the same period cov- 
ered by the sample  of manufacturing  firms  analyzed  later. We report  the 
percentage  of total  finance  coming  from  short-term  bank  debt, long-term 
bank debt, other long-term  debt, and retained  earnings  for six firm  size 
classifications. We also report the average retention ratio. The data 
exclude new equity issues, which are small in the aggregate.  Financing 
obtained  by small  firms  constitutes  a nontrivial  portion  of the aggregrate. 
Firms with under $10 million in assets accounted for 14 percent of the 
total finance raised over the period; firms with under $100 million in 
assets, for 26 percent  of the total. 
Internal  finance  in  the form  of retained  earnings  generates  the majority 
of net funds  for firms  in all size categories.  10  The importance  of internal 
9.  Early  case studies suggested  that small  firms  have more  limited  access to external 
finance  than  do large  firms.  See J. Keith  Butters  and  John  Lintner,  Effect  ofFederal Taxes 
on Growing  Enterprises  (Division  of Research,  Graduate  School of Business  Administra- 
tion, Harvard  University, 1945);  Meyer and Kuh, The Investment  Decision; Gordon 
Donaldson,  Corporate  Debt  Capacity:  A  Study  of  Corporate  Debt  Policy  and  the 
Determination  of Corporate Debt  Capacity  (Division  of Research,  Graduate School  of 
Business  Administration,  Harvard  University,  1961). 
10. This pattern  has been true historically  as well. U.S. manufacturing  firms  have 
relied  heavily  on internal  finance  for growth  and  development  since at least the end of the 
nineteenth  century.  See, for  example,  the  discussions  by  Lawrence  H. Seltzer,  A Financial 
History of the American Automobile  Industry (Houghton  Mifflin, 1928); and Meyer and 
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Table  1. Sources  of Funds,  by Asset Class, U.S. Manufacturing  Firms, 1970-84 
Source offunds (percent  of total)a  Percen- 
tage  of 
Short-  Long-  Other  long-term 
term  term  long-  debt  Average 
bank  bank  term  Retained  from  retention 
Firm size  debt  debt  debt  earnings  banks  ratio 
All firms  0.6  8.4  19.9  71.1  29.6  0.60 
Asset class 
Under $10 million  5.1  12.8  6.2  75.9  67.3  0.79 
$10-50 million  5.9  17.4  6.9  69.8  71.6  0.76 
$50-100 million  3.1  12.9  5.3  78.7  71.0  0.68 
$100-250  million  -0.2  13.3  12.0  74.9  52.4  0.63 
$250 million-$1  billion  -2.3  10.6  15.4  76.3  40.8  0.56 
Over $1 billion  -0.6  4.8  27.9  67.9  14.7  0.52 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based  on data taken from U.S.  Department  of Commerce,  Bureau of the Census, 
Quiar  ter  ly Finantcial Reports of Manzufacturing,  Mininig, antd  Trade Corporations,  various issues.  The data underlying 
the calculations  are expressed  in 1982 dollars. 
a.  Funds raised from new equity  issues  are excluded  from the calculations. 
finance  would be even greater  if we were able to include  information  on 
depreciation  allowances, a source of internal  funds roughly equal to 
retained  earnings.  Furthermore,  the proportion  of earnings  retained  by 
firms  differs  substantially  by size classes. The average  retention  ratio  is 
almost  80 percent  for the smallest  firms  in table 1;  it drops  monotonically 
as firm size increases, to a low of approximately  50 percent for firms 
with assets of more  than  $1 billion.  " 
Differences  in debt finance  across size groupings  are also important. 
Firms  in the smallest  classes accounted  for the majority  of net new short- 
term  bank debt. Firms  with assets of less than $250 million  got most of 
their  debt finance  from banks-lending institutions  specializing  in mon- 
itoring borrowers through customer relationships-while  firms with 
11. It is not likely that differences  in retention  rates by size grouping  are traceable 
solely to the relative  tax price  of dividends  in determining  payout  for small  corporations 
with concentrated  ownership.  For example, Dun and Bradstreet  surveyed  365 ("small," 
"medium-sized,"  and "large")  manufacturing  concerns  in 1937  to determine  the sources 
of increased  net worth  from 1920  to 1928,  a period  in which  the relative  price  of dividends 
and  retentions  (capital  gains)  to shareholders  was virtually  unity.  Of  small  firms,  94  percent 
obtained  more  than  90 percent  of their  finance  from  retention,  compared  with 70 percent 
for large  firms.  Sixteen percent  of large  firms  obtained  at least half  of their  finance  from 
new share  issues over the period,  compared  with only 1 percent  of the small  firms.  The 
survey results are reviewed in detail in Willard  L. Thorp  and Edwin B. George, "An 
Appraisal  of the Undistributed  Profits  Tax," Dun's Review  (September  1937),  pp. 5-36. 148  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1988 
assets of more  than  $1 billion  financed  more  than  85 percent  of their  new 
debt through  nonbank  sources. 
Independent  evidence by Philip  Srini  Vasan indicates  that manufac- 
turing  corporations  with assets of less than $100 million raised only 2 
percent of their total finance from net new share issues from 1960 to 
1980.12  Srini  Vasan also finds that internal  finance  is more volatile over 
the business cycle in small  and medium-sized  corporations  than  in large 
corporations. Moreover, during downturns, large firms have greater 
relative access to short-term  and long-term debt markets. Hence, if 
internal and external sources of funds are not perfect substitutes, 
business recessions and changes in corporate tax policy that affect 
internal  finance  will likely have a greater  effect on the growth  rates and 
investment  behavior  of small, immature  enterprises. 
THE  COST  OF  INTERNAL  VERSUS  EXTERNAL  FINANCE 
To provide a microfoundation  for links between a firm's financial 
structure  and its real investment spending, one must identify reasons 
why internal  and  external  finance  are not perfect  substitutes  in practice. 
In fact, explanations  why internal  finance may be less costly than new 
share issues and debt finance abound. Among the most prominent  are 
transaction  costs, tax advantages, agency problems, costs of financial 
distress, and  asymmetric  information.  We emphasize  asymmetric  infor- 
mation  between managers  and  potential  new investors  or creditors. 
New Share  Issues.  New share  issues of seasoned  equity  in the United 
States are typically  carried  out by underwriters  who purchase  a block of 
new shares and resell it. Relative to gross proceeds, the cost of a new 
share issue,  including underwriting  discounts, registration  fees  and 
taxes, and selling and administrative  expenses, can vary substantially 
by size of offering.  Costs for small offerings  can be high.3  In addition, 
both direct and indirect costs of offerings are higher  for initial public 
offerings  than  for seasoned offerings. 
12. Philip  Vijay Srini Vasan, "Credit  Rationing  and Corporate  Investment"  (Ph.D. 
dissertation,  Harvard  University,  October  1986). 
13. Transaction  costs were recognized  as a substantial  impediment  to the ability  of 
small  and  medium-sized  firms  to raise  equity  capital  in the 1930s.  See U.S. Securities  and 
Exchange  Commission,  "Cost of Flotation  for Registered  Securities,  1938-1939"  (Wash- 
ington,  D.C.: Research  and  Statistics  Section,  Trading  and  Exchange  Division,  Securities 
and  Exchange  Commission,  March  1941). Steven  M. Fazzari,  R.  Glenn Hlubbard, and Br-uce C. Petersen  149 
The design of the corporate  tax system in the United States and in 
other countries has historically  imparted  a cost advantage  to internal 
equity finance over external equity finance. In the United States for 
many  years, the effective tax rate on capital  gains has been much  lower 
than  the tax rate  on dividends.  Recent studies show that  this differential 
gives a cost advantage  to internal  finance;  while no tax savings accrue 
from the issue of new shares, tax savings do arise when earnings  are 
retained  rather  than  paid out, because a dividend  tax is replaced  with a 
lower tax on capital  gains. 
Mervyn King and Alan Auerbach calculate shadow prices for the 
cost of internal  finance (r) and the cost of new share issues (S).14  They 
establish that r =  p/(1-  T)(1-c)  and s=p/(1-T)(1-0),  where p is the 
after-tax  rate  of return  required  by the capital  market,  T is the corporate 
tax rate, and c and 0 are the tax rates on capital gains and dividends, 
respectively. The tax cost of new share issues can be expressed as 
(s -  r)!r -  (0 -  c)/(1 -  0).Alternatively,  within a q framework, the thresh- 
old marginal  q value a project  must attain  to be undertaken  depends on 
how it is financed.  Shareholders  benefit  from  externally  financed  projects 
only if their marginal  q exceeds unity. On the other hand, projects 
financed with retentions need only attain a q of (1 -  0)/(1 -  c) <  1. 
Asymmetric information  can generate potentially significant cost 
disadvantages  of external  finance  for some kinds  of firms.  The  theoretical 
arguments  that  support  this view draw  heavily  on the "lemons" problem 
first considered  by George Akerlof."5  The core of the argument  is that 
Clifford  Smith finds that total costs as a percentage  of proceeds in a sample of 
underwritten  issues from 1971  to 1975  vary  from 14  percent  for issues under  $1 million  to 
4 percent  for issues over $100  million.  Similar  estimates  of the cost differential  by size of 
issue have been made  in other studies. Clifford  W. Smith,  Jr., "Alternative  Methods  for 
Raising  Capital:  Rights  versus  Underwritten  Offerings,"  Journal  of Financial  Economics, 
vol. 5 (December  1977),  table 1, p. 277. 
14.  Mervyn A. King, Public Policy and the Corporation (London: Chapman and Hall, 
1977);  Alan J. Auerbach, "Wealth  Maximization  and the Cost of Capital," Quarterly 
Journal  of Economics, vol. 93 (August 1979),  pp. 433-46. See also David F. Bradford, 
"The Incidence  and  Allocation  Effects of a Tax on Corporate  Distributions,"  Journal  of 
Public Economics, vol.  15 (February 1981), pp. 1-22; and the review of alternative 
approaches  in James  M. Poterba  and Lawrence  H. Summers,  "The Economic  Effects of 
Dividend  Taxation," in Edward  I. Altman  and Marti  G. Subrahmanyam,  eds., Recent 
Advances  in Corporate  Finance (Homewood,  Illinois:  Richard  D. Irwin, 1985),  pp. 227- 
84. 
15. George A. Akerlof, "The Market  for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty  and the 
Market  Mechanism,"  Quarterly  Journal  of Economics, vol. 84 (August  1970),  pp. 488- 
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some sellers with inside information  about the quality  of an asset or a 
security  will be unwilling  to accept the terms  offered  by a less-informed 
buyer. This may cause the market  to break  down, or at least force the 
sale of an asset at a price  lower than  it would command  if all buyers  and 
sellers had  full information. 
These ideas are applied  to the problem  of equity finance  by Stewart 
Myers and Nicholas Majluf  and by Bruce Greenwald,  Joseph Stiglitz, 
and  Andrew  Weiss. In these "pecking  order"  or "financing  hierarchy" 
theories,  the firm's  managers  are  assumed  to have full  information  about 
the value  of the  firm's  existing  assets and  the  returns  from  new  investment 
projects.  16 Thus, to the extent that managers  control sufficient  internal 
funds to finance  all profitable  investment  projects, investment  demand 
models based on a representative  firm  in a perfect  capital  market  apply. 
Suppose,  however, that  a firm  exhausts  all its internal  funds  and  requires 
external finance to undertake a desirable project. In the Myers and 
Majluf  model, external  investors  cannot  distinguish  the quality  of firms; 
they value them all at the population average. Consequently, new 
shareholders  implicitly demand a premium  to purchase the shares of 
relatively good firms to offset the losses that will arise from funding 
lemons. The premium  can raise the cost of new equity finance  faced by 
managers  of relatively  high-quality  firms  above the opportunity  cost of 
internal  finance  faced by existing shareholders. 
The intuition  behind  the lemons premium  can be described  in terms 
of the q model of investment. Following  Myers and Majluf,  we can say 
that an investment that requires new share issues will be undertaken 
only if it increases the wealth of existing shareholders.  For good firms, 
the true gross returns  from assets in place are denoted by Y and the 
returns from a new project by Y'. Myers and Majluf show that new 
shares  will be issued only if 
Y/I ?  Y/V, 
16. Stewart  C. Myers  and  Nicholas S. Majluf,  "Corporate  Financing  and  Investment 
Decisions When Firms Have Information  That Investors Do Not Have," Jouwrnal  of 
Financial Economics, vol.  13 (June 1984), pp. 187-221; Bruce Greenwald,  Joseph E. 
Stiglitz, and Andrew Weiss, "Information  Imperfections  in the Capital Market and 
Macroeconomic  Fluctuations,"  American  Economic  Review, vol. 74 (May 1984,  Papers 
and Proceedings, 1983),  pp. 194-99. The pecking-order  view is described  in Stewart  C. 
Myers, "The Capital  Structure  Puzzle," Journal  of Finance, vol. 39 (July  1984),  pp. 575- 
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where I is the cost of the new investment and V is the market value 
assigned  to both good firms  and lemons. This condition  is equivalent  to 
requiring  that the marginal  q on the new project  at least equal the ratio 
of the firm's  true average  q-call  it q*-to  the average  q assigned to all 
firms  by the market  (-q).  With  full information,  q*/ q -- 1, and  the thresh- 
old q value for issuing new shares would be unity, as in conventional 
models. When  good firms  initially  cannot  be distinguished  from  lemons, 
however, q*/ -q  will exceed unity  for good firms.  This ratio  indicates  how 
much dilution  occurs when such firms  issue new shares. The quantity 
(q*l  -q)  -  1 is the lemons premium  that  we denote by Ql. 
Debt Finance.  Standard  treatments  of the effects of leverage on the 
firm's  cost of funds  posit an increasing  marginal  cost of new debt due to 
costs of financial  distress  and  agency  costs. Financial  distress  costs arise 
when  a firm  has  difficulties  meeting  its  principal  and  interest  obligations- 
the extreme  case being  bankruptcy.  Agency costs arise  from  the limited- 
liability  feature  of debt  contracts  that  creates  incentives  forfirm  managers 
to act counter  to the interests  of creditors  under  some circurmstances. 
Debt finance, particularly  long-term  debt, creates agency pr-oblems. 
The greater  the debt-equity  ratio, the more the incentives of managers 
who act in the interest of equity owners diverge from the interests of 
creditors. Managers may forgo some investment opportunities  with 
positive net present values and accept others with negative present 
values. They also have incentives to issue new debt that raises the 
riskiness and lowers the valuie of existing debt. Because creditors 
understand  the conflicts of interest that exist between themselves and 
equity holders, they demand covenants that restrict the behavior of 
managers,  particularly  with respect to new debt issues." As a result, 
covenants typically stipulate  target  debt-equity  ratios. While they may 
provide a second-best solution to the contracting  problem given the 
potential  for opportunism,  they are not costless, and their restrictions 
on financial  flexibility  limit  management's  choices of iinvestment  oppor- 
tunities, as well as the ability  to finance  investment  opportunities  when 
internal  funds are low. If covenants impose working capital require- 
ments, for example, the supply of internal  funds available to finance 
investment  may be reduced. Hence, shocks to working  capital, such as 
17. See the description  of covenants  in Clifford  W. Smith,  Jr., and  Jerold  B. Warner, 
"On Financial  Contracting:  An Analysis of Bond Covenants," Journal of Financial 
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a debt deflation  or a decline in internal  finance, will make debt finance 
more  expensive at the margin,  probably  at a time when the need for new 
debt is most acute. 
Asymmetric information  in markets  for debt can cause distortions 
similar  to those discussed previously  for new share  issues. Asymmetric 
information  may increase the cost of new debt, or even result in credit 
rationing. Dwight Jaffee and Thomas Russell show that the market 
interest  rate  must  rise, and  loan size may  be limited,  when  lenders  cannot 
distinguish borrower quality.18  Stiglitz and Weiss demonstrate that 
"'equilibrium  credit  rationing"  can arise from  adverse selection. Again, 
the lemons argument is  critical. Lenders cannot price discriminate 
between  good borrowers  and  bad  in loan contracts  because of asymmet- 
ric  information.  Thus,  when  interest  rates  rise, relatively  good  borrowers 
drop  out of the market,  increasing  the probability  of default  and  possibly 
reducing  the lenders'  expected profit.  In equilibrium,  lenders  may set an 
interest  rate  that  leaves an excess demand  for loans in the market.  Some 
borrowers  receive loans while other  observationally  equivalent  borrow- 
ers are rationed.  19 
Calomiris  and Hubbard  add heterogeneous  debt markets  and agents 
that  are restricted  from  borrowing  in some markets  to the Stiglitz-Weiss 
structure.20  Two credit markets,  a "full-information"  market  (bond or 
commercial  paper, for example) and a bank loan market,  coexist. The 
banks  specialize  in  financing  projects  of borrowers  for  which  information 
problems  are more severe, in the sense that  costs of obtaining  borrower 
information  are high and lenders can reduce average  information  costs 
by maintaining  long-term  relationships.  The central  proposition  in this 
work is that, depending  on per capita levels of internal  net worth, the 
18. Dwight  M. Jaffee  and  Thomas  Russell, "Imperfect  Information,  Uncertainty  and 
Credit  Rationing,"  Quarterly Journal  of  Economics,  vol.  90  (November  1976),  pp. 
651-66. 
19. Joseph  E. Stiglitz  and  Andrew  Weiss, "Credit  Rationing  in  Markets  with  Imperfect 
Information,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol. 71 (June  1981),  pp. 393-410. 
20. Charles W. Calomiris  and R. Glenn Hubbard,  "Firm Heterogeneity, Internal 
Finance, and Credit  Rationing,"  Working  Paper 2497 (National Bureau  of Economic 
Research,  January  1988).  In addition,  the importance  of borrower  net worth  for obtaining 
external finance is stressed by Hayne E. Leland and David H. Pyle, "Informational 
Asymmetries,  Financial  Structure,  and Financial  Intermediation,"  Journal  of Finance, 
vol. 32 (May  1977),  pp. 371-87;  Myers  and  Majluf,  "Corporate  Financing  Decisions";  Ben 
S. Bernanke  and  Mark  Gertler,  "Financial  Fragility  and  Economic  Performance,"  Working 
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allocation  of new funds to classes of borrowers  could either follow the 
full-information  credit  allocation  or ration  funds  away  from  some classes 
of borrowers  who would receive credit in the absence of asymmetric 
information.  A "financial  collapse" may occur, in which some or all 
classes of asymmetric-information  borrowers  are denied  loans. 
Finally, while it is generally  true that higher  leverage entails a higher 
shadow  price of funds, only the largest  and most mature  firms  are likely 
to face a smoothly increasing loan interest rate. Several features of 
heterogeneity  are important  here. Small  and  medium-sized  firms  are  less 
likely to have access to impersonal  centralized  debt markets. Indeed, 
outside the Fortune  500 companies,  the overwhelming  majority  of bond 
finance has been obtained historically through private placements, 
usually  with life insurance  companies  or pension  funds. Two features  of 
private  placements  are significant.  First, they are more restrictive  than 
typical  bond  arrangements,  requiring  minimum  levels of working  capital 
and stockholders' equity and often limiting dividend payments and 
capital spending. Second, during periods of tight credit, small and 
medium-sized  borrowers  are  often  denied  loans  in  favor  of better-quality 
borrowers, who could also obtain funds from centralized securities 
markets.  Similarly,  bank  loans and lines of credit, the typical source of 
finance for smaller industrial  firms, restrict operating flexibility and 
require particular  levels for certain financial  operating  ratios.21  With 
constant  investment  opportunities,  it is precisely in times of a decline in 
21. With  respect to private  placements,  see the extensive discussion in Eli Shapiro 
and Charles  Wolf, who note that  from 1953  to 1970,  Fortune  500 companies  obtained  an 
average  of 37 percent  of their  bond  finance  through  private  placements,  compared  with  an 
average  of 75 percent  for other  manufacturing  firms.  Eli Shapiro  and  Charles  R. Wolf, The 
Role of Private Placements  in Corporate Finance (Division of Research, Graduate School 
of Business  Administration,  Harvard  University,  1972),  p. 150. 
With  respect  to bank  finance,  see the analysis  of data  for manufacturing  firms  from  the 
Quarterly  Financial  Reports of the U.S. Bureau  of the Census in Srini Vasan, "Credit 
Rationing,"  chap. 3. Although  small  businesses  can borrow  from  commercial  banks,  the 
banks  cannot  (absent  secured  mortgages)  furnish  long-term  funds  as a substitute  for  equity 
or bonds;  maturities  of from three to five years are typically  the longest available.  The 
Small Business Administration,  which can guarantee  loans of longer maturities,  is not 
active in industrial  finance;  see Barry  P. Bosworth,  Andrew  S. Carron,  and  Elizabeth  H. 
Rhyne, The Economics  of Federal Credit Programs (Brookings,  1987). 
For the use of financial  ratios as a predictor  of bankruptcy,  see Edward  I. Altman, 
"Financial  Ratios, Discriminant  Analysis  and the Prediction  of Corporate  Bankruptcy," 
Journal  of Finance, vol. 23 (September  1968),  pp. 589-609. 154  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1988 
internal  finance  that such firms  cannot  obtain  debt finance  on the margin 
for capital  spending  projects. 
As we noted before, covenants in debt contracts  protect  the interests 
of bondholders  from  opportunistic  behavior  on the part  of shareholders. 
To the extent that difficulties  in contracting  in debt markets  are related 
only to agency problems and not to asymmetric information,  equity 
markets  could provide  the marginal  source of external  finance  for firms. 
However, firms  facing asymmetric  information  problems  in credit  mar- 
kets will also probably  need to pay a premium  to obtain new equity. 
Therefore, equity finance  will not, in general, solve asymmetric  infor- 
mation  problems  associated  with debt. 
"Financing Hierarchies" and Investment 
The preceding  discussion of the cost premium  that some firms  must 
pay for external  finance  can be integrated  into a model of firm  financial 
and investment  decisions developed in the public  finance  literature  (see 
Appendix A and the references therein). In the standard  model, the 
value of a firm, V, is the present value of the posttax dividend stream 
adjusted  for the amount of new share issues, VN,  that current  equity 
holders  would have to purchase  to maintain  their  proportional  claim on 
the firm.  Formally,  the value of the firm  is 
(1)  v =t  ( I  +  iDt+i-VtN+i 
where p is the required  return on equity, Dt represents the dividend 
payment  in period  t, 0 is the tax rate on dividends, and c is the tax rate 
on capital  gains. Managers  maximize  the value of existing shareholders' 
stock subject  to a set of constraints  on the distribution  of earnings  (see 
Appendix  A). The solution  for the case of 0 > c is well known;  it is never 
optimal  to issue new shares and pay dividends  at the same time. Here, 
whenever  internal  finance  exceeds  desired  investment,  q  is 
(1 -  0)/(1 -  c) <  1 in equilibrium, as discussed  previously.  A value- 
maximizing  firm will issue new shares only after it exhausts internal 
finance  anid  q > 1. Thus, the breakeven  q a project  must attain  depends 
on how it will be financed. 
The same  kind  of logic applies  to firms  facing  asymmetric  information, 
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much larger.  The above expression for V, can be modified  to include a 
lemons premium  demanded by potential new equity investors when 
asymmetric  information  problems  exist. We reduce V, in equation 1 by 
an amount  fl, per dollar  of new equity issued, or 
(2)  +0U 
) 
,=o  Vt 
I-c  [(-  Dt+i  -(  I+  +i)  t+i] 
where fl reflects the additional  value that new investors demand  from 
good firms  to compensate them for the losses they incur  from inadver- 
tently  funding  lemons.  With  this  modification  to the  model,  the  breakeven 
q value for investment  projects  financed  by new share issues becomes 
This financing  hierarchy  is depicted  in figure  1. The solid lines in the 
figure  represent  a simple  case of a discontinuous  differential  in the costs 
of internal  and external equity finance.22  When investment demand  is 
low, as with the DI schedule, capital spending can be financed from 
internally  generated  funds, at the expense of extra dividends. At very 
high levels of investment demand, as with the D3 schedule, firms  will 
issue new shares. The higher  the value of fl, the greater  the likelihood 
that internal  finance  will constrain  a firm's  investment,  as illustrated  by 
the D2 schedule. Of course, the lemons premium  can vary both across 
firms  and over time for the same firm.  If information  problems  become 
less severe, the top horizontal  schedule in figure 1 will shift downward 
toward  unity. 
Debt finance  can also be incorporated.  To the extent that debt can be 
secured, or obtained from lenders, such as commercial banks, that 
specialize in monitoring  the borrower, information  problems in debt 
markets  will be less severe than those in external equity markets, but 
the marginal  cost of debt will increase with leverage, as discussed 
22. Some  recent  studies  have tested  for implied  cost differences  between  internal  and 
external  equity  finance.  See Robert  L. McDonald  and  Naomi  Soderstrom,  "Dividend  and 
Share  Changes:  Is There  a Financing  Hierarchy?"  Working  Paper  2029  (NBER,  September 
1986);  Avner Kalay and A. Shimrat,  "On the Payment  of Equity-Financed  Dividends" 
(New York  University,  December  1985);  Kalay  and  Shimrat,  "Firm  Value  and  Seasoned 
Equity  Issues: Price  Pressure,  Wealth  Distribution,  or Negative Information,"  Working 
Paper  894/86  (New York University,  March  1986).  Also see Paul  Asquith  and David W. 
Mullins,  Jr., "Equity  Issues and  Offering  Dilution,"  Journal  of Financial  Economics,  vol. 
15  (January-February  1986),  pp. 61-89;  and  Ronald  Masulis  and  A. N. Korwar,  "Seasoned 
Equity  Offerings:  An Empirical  Investigation,"  Journal  of Financial  Economics,  vol. 15 
(January-February  1986),  pp. 91-118. 156  Brookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity,  1:1988 
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previously. This modified  hierarchy  is illustrated  by the dotted line in 
figure  1 that connects the two horizontal  segments in the middle  range 
of the figure. Hence, intermediate  levels of investment demand, as 
illustrated  by the D2  schedule,  will be financed  by a mix  of internal  funds 
and  debt. 
This financing  hierarchy  has a number  of implications  for q values 
and  investment  behavior.  First, all other  things  equal,  observed  q values 
will differ  in firms  with different  information  characteristics.  For firms 
facing asymmetric  information,  the observed q value will be the value 
assigned by the imperfectly  informed  market.  The model also predicts 
that q must be substantially  higher to induce a new share issue for 
limited-information  (high fl)  firms than for full-information  (low fQ) 
firms. 
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average  q assigned  by the market  and  its relationship  to new share  issues. 
Observed  q can move independently  from  the true valuation  for limited- 
information  firms. For example, the market  may reappraise  the under- 
lying probability  that a firm  is a lemon. If the asymmetric  information 
problem is important  empirically, observed q values should be high 
relative to historical values before new share issues for limited-infor- 
mation  firms. 
Finally,  internal  finance  constrains  spending  for firms  that do not pay 
dividends  and face an investment  demand  schedule like D2 in figure 1. 
When  q is sufficiently  high, new shares  are issued, and movements  in q 
lead to movements  in investment.  Otherwise,  investment  will be driven 
by changes  in internal  finance. In the limiting  case, with a vertical  debt 
supply schedule, variations  in the length of the retention segment in 
figure 1 should cause corresponding  variations  in investment  for firms 
that pay no dividends. More generally, the slope of the debt supply 
schedule  will determine  the extent to which firms  can offset reductions 
in  internal  finance  with  greater  leverage.  Therefore,  the larger  the lemons 
premium,  fl, the greater  the chances that  a firm  will have an investment 
demand  curve like  D2, where  investment  opportunities,  as measured  by 
a project's  marginal  q, can vary,  while  investment  responses  are  affected 
by the availability  of internal finance. Such a pattern resembles the 
predictions  of sales-accelerator  models of investment;  we discuss this 
point  in more  detail  later. 
In summary, if the cost of capital differs by source of funds, the 
availability of finance will likely have an effect on the investment 
practices of some firms. In financing  hierarchy models like the one 
summarized  in figure  1, the availability  of internal  funds allows firms  to 
undertake  desirable  investment  projects without  resorting  to high-cost 
external  finance.  In addition,  to the extent that  a firm  seeks debt finance 
at the margin,  greater  internal  cash flow enhances its balance  sheet and 
net worth  positions, lowering  the cost of new debt. 
Differences in Firm Financing Practices 
To examine the empirical  importance  of these ideas for explaining 
investment,  we use a large  panel of Value Line data  for manufacturing 
firms.  The  details  of the sample  structure  and  definitions  of the empirical 
variables  are discussed in Appendix B. The firms  in this data base are 158  Brookings Paper-s on Economic  Activity,  1.1988 
typically  large,  and  their  stock is publicly  traded.  Evidence that some of 
these firms  face financing  constraints  should indicate  that the phenom- 
enon is widespread. 
Our approach  is to study differences  in financing  and investment in 
groups  of firms  with different  characteristics.  Observed  retention  prac- 
tices provide  a useful  a priori  criterion  for identifying  firms  that  are  likely 
to face relatively  high  costs of external  finance.  If the cost disadvantage 
of external finance is large, it should have the greatest effect on firms 
that retain  most of their income. If the cost disadvantage  is slight, then 
retention practices should reveal little about financing practices, q 
values, or investment  behavior.23 
Our classification scheme divides firms into three groups. Class 1 
firms have a ratio of dividends to income less than 0.1 for at least 10 
years. Class 2 firms  have a dividend-income  ratio  less than  0.2, but more 
than  0.  1, for at least 10  years. Class 3 includes  all other  firms. 
We considered  further  divisions of the high-payout  firms  in class 3. 
but we did not find substantial  differences between firms  that paid out 
20-40 percent of their income on average as dividends and firms that 
paid out more than 40 percent. Because of possible outliers of the 
dividend-income  ratio, due to abnormally  low income in a particular 
year, this approach  is more robust than classifying firms  according  to 
their  average  retention  ratio. 
One reason why firms  might pay low dividends is that they require 
investment  finance  that  exceeds their  internal  cash flow and  retain  all of 
the low-cost internal  funds  they can generate.  A second is that  they have 
little or no income to distribute.  We are interested  in the first  group  and, 
for this reason, have included only those firms in the sample that had 
positive real sales growth  from 1969  through  1984.  To avoid any biases 
across retention  classes, this restriction  was applied  to all firms  in the 
sample,  not  just the low-dividend  class. The results  that  follow were not 
changed substantially  by including  firms  with negative sales growth in 
the sample. 
23. Our scheme for grouping  firms  according  to differences  in dividend  behavior  is 
similar to tests for the presence of liquidity constraints on consumption. in which 
households are grouped  into high-wealth  and low-wealth  categories. See for example 
Fumio  Hayashi,  "The  Effect  of Liquidity  Constraints  on Consumption:  A Cross-Sectional 
Anialysis," Quarterly Joutrnal of Economics,  vol. 100  (February  1985), pp. 183-206;  and 
Stephen P. Zeldes, "Consumption  and Liquidity  Constraints:  An Empirical  Investiga- 
tion," Working  Paper  24-85 (Rodney L. White Center  for Research, Wharton  School, 
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Table 2.  Summary Statistics: Sample of Manufacturing Firms,  1970-84 
Category  of firm 
Statistic  Class la  Class 2b  Class 3c 
Number  of firms  49  39  334 
Average retention  ratio  0.94  0.83  0.58 
Percent  of years with 
positive dividends  33  83  98 
Average  real sales growth 
(percent  per year)  13.7  8.7  4.6 
Average investment- 
capital  ratio  0.26  0.18  0.12 
Average cash flow- 
capital  ratio  0.30  0.26  0.21 
Average correlations  of 
cash flow with investment 
(deviations  from trend)d  0.92  0.82  0.20 
Average  of firm  standard 
deviations  of investment- 
capital  ratios  0.17  0.09  0.06 
Average  of firm  standard 
deviations  of cash flow- 
capital  ratios  0.20  0.09  0.06 
Capital  stock (millions  of 1982  dollars) 
Average  capital  stock, 1970  100.6  289.7  1,270.0 
Median  capital  stock, 1970  27.1  54.2  401.6 
Average  capital  stock, 1984  320.0  653.4  2,190.6 
Median  capital  stock, 1984  94.9  192.5  480.8 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based  on samples  selected  from the Value Line data base.  See  Appendix  B. 
a.  Firms with dividend-income  ratios of less  than 0.1 for at least  10 years. 
b.  Firms with dividend-income  ratios greater than 0.1 but less  than 0.2 for at least  10 years. 
c.  Firms with dividend-income  ratios greater than 0.2. 
d.  Estimnated  fromn  time series  constructed  by aggregating the sample data within each category. 
Several  summary  statistics  for the firms  in each class are  presented  in 
table  2. Our  class 1  firms,  those that  we hypothesize  will more  likely  face 
binding  financial  constraints,  retained  an average  of 94 percent of their 
income and paid a dividend in only 33 percent of the years. Many of 
these firms paid no dividends for the first 7 to 10 years and a small 
dividend  in the remaining  years. In fact, 20 firms  never paid  a dividend. 
Class 1  firms  experienced  much  more  rapid  growth  in the fixed  capital 
stock than  the mature  firms  in class 3. Mean values of the capital  stock 
are, of course, influenced  by extreme values. The growth pattern  for 
median  values is similarly  striking.  While class 1 firms  are smaller  than 
firms in class 3, they are still large relative to U.S.  manufacturing 
corporations  in general;  85 percent of manufacturing  corporations  had 160  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1988 
smaller  capital stocks in 1970  than the average class 1 firm.24  Firms in 
class 1 have a high mean investment-to-capital  ratio, and they exhaust 
nearly all of their cash flow on investment spending. Firms in class 3 
spend a much lower proportion  of their cash flow on investment. Both 
cash flow and investment are more volatile in class 1, as the standard 
deviation statistics in table 2 indicate. Table 2 also shows a striking 
difference in the correlation  of deviations from exponential trends of 
cash flow and investment between classes 1 and 2 and class 3. These 
statistics are estimated  from  time series constructed  by aggregating  the 
sample data within each class. The correlations suggest the greater 
sensitivity of investment  to cash flow in classes 1 and 2 that we find in 
the regression  equations  that  follow. 
The data in table 3 present information  on new share issues, debt 
finance,  and  q values  for  firms  in the various  classes.25  Other  things  being 
equal, one would expect firms in class 1 to rely more heavily on new 
share  issues than  firms  in the remaining  classes. The typical  firm  in class 
1 has an investment demand schedule like D2  or D3  in figure 1. The 
typical firm in class 3 has a demand schedule like D1 and should not 
simultaneously  pay dividends  and  issue new shares,  given the historical 
differences  in dividend  and  capital  gains  tax rates. Consistent  with their 
rapid growth, firms in class  1 issue new shares more frequently- 
approximately  one year  in  every  four-than the firms  in  the  other  classes. 
Firms in the first class also raise a greater  proportion  of total finance 
from new shares. Even for class 1 firms, however, new share issues 
provide a much smaller proportion  of total funds than internal cash 
flows. 
24. We estimated  a probit  model  for the probability  that  a firm  is included  in class 1- 
as a function  of size (capital  stock in 1977),  average  real sales growth  over the sample 
period, the average  value of q, the average  value of the ratio of outstanding  debt to the 
market  value  of debt  and  equity,  and  the standard  deviation  of earnings  (measured  relative 
to the capital  stock). The results  are consistent  with  what  one would  expect based  on the 
summary  statistics  reported  in table 2. While  firms  in class 1 are smaller  on average  than 
firms  in class 3, size as such does not appear  to be the dominant  factor  explaining  why 
firms  fall into the high-retention  class 1. The size variable  in the probit  equation  has a 
negative  estimated  coefficient,  but it is not as statistically  or economically  significant  as 
the estimated  coefficients  for most of the other  variables. 
25. Some  firms  reported  infrequent,  but  very  small  new share  issues  that  were  probably 
associated  with executive stock option  plans. In the calculations  presented  in table  3, we 
excluded  such small  issues by requiring  that  funds  raised  from  new common  stock  exceed 
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Table 3.  New Share Issues, Tobin's q, and Debt Statistics 
for Manufacturing Firms,  1970-84 
Item  Class 1  Class 2  Class 3 
Average percentage  of years 
with new share  issues  28  19  10 
Average value of share  issues as 
a percentage  of cash flow  23  13  8 
Average  annual  q valuesa  3.8  2.4  1.6 
(0.4)  (0.2)  (0.  1) 
Median  q values  1.6  1.4  1.0 
Average  difference  in q values 
between periods  of new share 
issues and periods  of no new  1.6  0.9  0.2 
share  issuesa  (0.8)  (0.4)  (0.1) 
Average  ratio of debt to 
capital  stock  0.57  0.52  0.33 
Average  ratio of interest 
payments  to sum of interest 
payments  plus cash flows  0.27  0.21  0.17 
Correlation  of the earnings-to- 
capital  ratio and the change in 
total debt-to-capital  ratio 
(averaged  over firms)  0.23  0.15  0.09 
Source:  Same as table 2. 
a.  The standard error of the mean appears in parentheses. 
The last three lines of table 3 provide information  on debt use. 
Although one would expect the firms in class 3 to have higher debt 
capacities, the debt-to-capital  and interest  expense ratios  are higher  for 
classes 1 and 2. These results are consistent with a financing  hierarchy 
and support the idea that constrained firms borrow up to their debt 
capacity.26  Nor is there  any  indication  in the data  that  debt  issues smooth 
fluctuations  in cash flow. For 43 of the 49 class 1 firms,  the correlation 
of the earnings-to-capital  ratio  with  the change  in  the total  debt-to-capital 
ratio  is positive. As shown  in table  3, the average  correlation  of earnings 
26. The pattern  of debt leverage across classes also holds for debt-equity  ratios 
measured  as the book value  of debt divided  by the book value  of common  equity. For the 
empirical  effect of debt service on investment,  see Allen Sinai  and Otto Eckstein, "Tax 
Policy and Business Fixed Investment  Revisited," Journal  of Economic  Behavior  and 
Organization,  vol. 4 (June-September  1983),  pp. 131-62;  Steven M. Fazzari  and  Michael 
J. Athey, "Asymmetric  Information,  Financing  Constraints,  and  Investment,"  Review  of 
Economics  and Statistics,  vol. 69 (August 1987), pp. 481-87. 162  Brookings Papers  on Economiiic  Activity,  1:1988 
with  the change  in debt is positive for all classes, but  it is largest  for class 
1. This result also holds up in regressions that control for investment 
opportunities  through  q. The change in either long-term  or total debt is 
positively related  to cash flow when it is regressed on q and cash flow 
(all variables  were deflated  by the capital  stock). Therefore,  changes in 
debt appear to reinforce rather than offset fluctuations  in cash flow, 
especially for class 1 firms,  for which the positive estimated  sensitivity 
of changes  in debt to cash flow fluctuations  was the largest.27 
Table  3 also reports  Tobin's  q measures  for all  three  classes of firms.28 
The average  q value for the first  two classes is significantly  greater  than 
the averages  for the third.  The asymptotic  t-statistic  for the null  hypoth- 
esis that  the first  class mean  equals  the third  class mean  is 5.8. This  result 
also holds for every year in the sample individually.  Similar  patterns 
hold for median  q values. 
One might  interpret  the high  q values observed in class 1 as the result 
of high expected growth  rates. As table 1 shows, firms  in this class did 
indeed grow quickly over our sample period. Their high q values, 
however, beg the question  of why they did not invest even more. As an 
alternative  to financing  constraints, high adjustment  costs could slow 
convergence of q to a full-information  equilibrium.  Then, one would 
expect no systematic relation  between q and new share issues. Firms 
would invest at an optimal  pace to push q uniformly  toward  equilibrium, 
and  new shares  would  be issued  as necessary  to finance  capital  spending. 
The statistics in table 3, however, strongly  contradict  this view. We 
calculate  the differences  in q values in years with and  without  new share 
27. A more detailed examination  shows that for 21 of the class 1 firms, cash flow 
declined  25 percent  or more  on one or two occasions. In  almost  all  cases, cash flow  growth 
returned  to normal  in the next period,  and  the cash flow shock appeared  to be temporary. 
In 26 cases, the debt-to-capital  ratio  either  fell or remained  unchanged  in the next period; 
the ratio increased  in only 5 instances. The evidence also indicates  that debt is not on 
average  an important  source  of bridge  finance  between  new equity  issues for these firms. 
If new debt  were  issued  in the interim  between  new stock  offerings,  and  the proceeds  from 
the new equity  were  used to pay  off debt,  one would  expect a negative  correlation  between 
new share issues and the change in debt. For the firms in our sample, however, the 
correlations  between  new equity  finance  and  the changes  in both  total  and  long-term  debt 
were essentially  zero in all classes. 
28. For measures  of tax-adjusted  Q (see the definition  in Appendix  B), the patterns 
were even more  pronounced.  The unadjusted  q values reported  were calculated  with the 
book  value  of debt. The  results  were almost  identical  with  various  estimates  of the market 
value  of debt  (see Appendix  B). Steven M. Fazzari,  R.  Glenn Hubbard,  and Brlce  C. Petersen  163 
issues on a firm-by-firm  basis and then average these differences.29  As 
noted in the table, for the three classes of firms, this procedure  yields 
differences  of, respectively, 1.6, 0.9, and  0.2. As discussed  earlier,  these 
results  are consistent  with a financing  hierarchy. 
Financial Constraints in Empirical Models of Investment 
The theories discussed here imply that the supply of investment 
finance  is not  perfectly  elastic for  firms  that  face asymmetric  information 
problems in capital markets. This result is independent of how one 
models  the demand  side of the investment  decision. Indeed, the invest- 
ment  demand  curve presented  in figure  1 could be based on a q model  of 
investment or a neoclassical model. Regardless of the true economic 
process at the foundation  of investment  demand,  the supply  of low-cost 
finance,  and  therefore  the level of internal  cash flow, enters  the reduced- 
form  investment  equation  of firms  for  which  internal  and  external  finance 
are not perfect substitutes. 
In view of the longstanding  debates in the literature  over the appro- 
priate  specification  of the model's demand  side, we examine  three  broad 
empirical  specifications  that  encompass  the most common  approaches: 
models  based on q that  emphasize  market  valuations  of the firm's  assets 
as the determinant  of investment, sales accelerator models in which 
fluctuations  in sales or output  motivate  changes  in capital  spending,  and 
neoclassical models that combine measures of output and the cost of 
capital to explain investment demand. The most extensive tests of 
alternative  specifications  and estimation techniques are presented for 
the q model.  These tests lead  to similar  conclusions  for  the other  models. 
29. The average differences  reported  in table 3 are computed  as follows. We first 
compute  the average  difference  on a firm-by-firm  basis for all firms  that  issued shares,  as 
defined  above,  in  at  least  one of our  sample  years.  These  statistics  are  then  averaged  across 
firms  in each class to obtain  the results in table 2. Thus, differences  in average  q levels 
between  firms  that  issue shares  and  firms  that  do not  would  not  affect  the  reported  statistics. 
Similar  results  can be obtained  by regressing  q on year  dummies  and  a dummy  variable  for 
the new share  issues. 
An alternative  explanation  of the high q values in the firms  in class 1 is the relative 
importance  of "intangibles"  for such firms.  It is difficult,  however, to link that explana- 
tion to the large  differences  in q values between periods  in which new shares  are issued 
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The general  form of the reduced-form  investment  equations  that we 
examine is 
(3)  (I/K)it = f(X/K)it + g(CF/K)it +  uit, 
where  Ii represents  investment  in plant  and equipment  for firm  i during 
period t; X represents a vector of variables, possibly including  lagged 
values, that have been emphasized  as determinants  of investment  from 
a variety  of theoretical  perspectives;  and  u is an error  term.  The function 
g depends  on the firm's  internal  cash  flow  (CF);  it represents  the potential 
sensitivity of investment  to fluctuations  in available  internal  finance- 
after investment  opportunities  are controlled  for through  the variables 
inX.30  We analyze  other  measures  of internal  liquidity  later.  All variables 
are divided  by the beginning-of-period  capital  stock K. 
As  we  stressed in our review of the implications of information 
problems  in  capital  markets,  empirical  analysis  must  allow  for systematic 
differences in the effect of potential finance constraints across firms. 
Our classification  scheme based on retention  practices identifies  firms 
that are most likely to face capital  market  imperfections  and the corre- 
sponding  finance constraints.  The evidence on firm  financial  behavior 
and q values across our retention classes, presented in the previous 
section, supports  this view. If information  problems  in capital  markets 
lead to financing  constraints  on investment,  they should  be most evident 
for the classes of firms  that retain  most of their income. If internal  and 
external  finance  are nearly  perfect substitutes,  however, then retention 
practices  should  reveal little about  investment  by the firm.  Firms  would 
simply  use external  finance  to smooth  investment  when internal  finance 
fluctuates. 
This test does not simply  restate  the accounting  identity  that sources 
equal uses of funds. Investment spending  must be financed  somehow, 
and cash flow provides a source of finance. Under an assumption  of 
perfect capital  markets,  however, there is no reason to expect internal 
finance fluctuations to have different effects in firms with different 
30. Other  empirical  studies that consider  the effect of internal  funds on investment 
include  Kuh  and  Meyer,  "Investment,  Liquidity,  and  Monetary  Policy";  Robert  M. Coen, 
"The Effect of Cash Flow on the Speed of Adjustment,"  in Gary Fromm, ed.,  Tax 
Incentives and Capital Spending (Brookings,  1971), pp. 131-94; Eisner, Factors in  Business 
Investment;  Steven M. Fazzari  and  Tracy  L. Mott, "The Investment  Theories  of Kalecki 
and Keynes: An Empirical  Study  of Firm  Data, 1970-1982,"  Journal  of Post Keynesian 
Economics,  vol. 9 (Winter  1986-87),  pp. 171-87. Steven M. Fazzari,  R.  Glenn Hubbard,  and Bruce  C. Petersen  165 
retention  behavior. Internal  funds constitute only one possible source 
of investment  finance,  and  their  availability  should  not constrain  invest- 
ment  unless the firm  must  pay a premium  for new debt or equity  finance. 
INTERNAL  FUNDS  IN  A  Q  MODEL  OF  INVESTMENT 
We begin our empirical investigation of financing  constraints and 
investment  within  the q-theory  framework.31  The intuition  of the model 
is that, absent considerations  of taxes or capital market  imperfections, 
a value-maximizing  firm  will invest as long as the shadow value of an 
additional  unit of capital, marginal  q, exceeds unity. In equilibrium,  the 
value of an extra unit of capital is just its replacement  cost,  so that 
marginal  q is unity. The conceptual advantage of this framework  in 
modeling  the effects of internal  finance  on investment  is that q controls 
for the market's  evaluation  of the firm's  investment  opportunities.32 
We employ an empirical specification  derived from an adjustment 
cost technology, and follow Lawrence Summers  in specifying  a cost of 
adjustment  per unit of investment  relative to capital. In the absence of 
financing  constraints, Fumio Hayashi and Summers have linked the 
shadow  price to the market  value of existing capital  (that  is, average  q). 
In that approach, under quadratic adjustment costs,  investment is 
determined  according  to 
(4)  (IIK)it  =  Li  + [LpQit  + uit, 
where [i is the normal  value of ( I/K) for the ith firm  and uit  is an error 
term.33  The term Q represents the value of q at the beginning  of the 
31. See the original  discussions  in William  C. Brainard  and James  Tobin, "Pitfalls  in 
Financial Model Building," American Economic  Review,  vol.  58 (May 1968, Papers and 
Proceedings,  1967),  pp. 99-122;  and James  Tobin, "A General  Equilibrium  Approach  to 
Monetary Theory,"  Journal of Money,  Credit and Banking,  vol.  1 (February 1969), pp. 
15-29. 
32. Andrew  Abel and Olivier  Blanchard  found  important  roles for profits  and output 
in aggregate  investment  equations  relying  on q, suggesting  problems  of aggregation  or that 
alternative  sources of finance  are not perfect  substitutes.  Andrew  B. Abel and Olivier  J. 
Blanchard,  "The Present Value of Profits and Cyclical Movements in Investment," 
Economnetrica,  vol. 54 (March  1986),  pp. 249-73. 
33. The quadratic  adjustment  cost framework  that motivates a linear relationship 
between the investment-capital  ratio and q, and the adjustments  of q for corporate  and 
personal  taxation were developed by Andrew Abel, Lawrence Summers,  and Fumio 
Hayashi.  Assume that adjustment  costs, A, follow:  Ai, = (2pY)-'  [(IIK)i,  -  i -  UJ,]2 Ki,, 
if [(I/K)_,  -  ,L-] : 0; and  Ai, =  0, otherwise.  We also assume  that  shocks occur  during  the 166  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1988 
period  and is defined  as the sum of the value of equity and debt less the 
value  of inventories  divided  by the replacement  cost of the capital  stock, 
adjusted  for corporate  and  personal  tax considerations  (see Appendix  B 
for details). Estimates  based on unadjusted  q are very similar. 
Table  4 presents  estimates  of the Q investment  model, including  cash 
flow, for each of  the three retention classes.  The equations were 
estimated  with fixed firm  and year effects.34  Results are reported  over 
three time periods, 1970-75, 1970-79, and 1970-84. There are two 
reasons to expect that  the sensitivity  of investment  to cash flow in class 
1 will be most pronounced  in the shorter periods. First, most class 1 
firms  (26 out of 49) began paying  dividends  in the last two years of the 
sample, and were no longer  exhausting  all their  internal  funds. Second, 
as firms  mature  and  more  observations  of project  realizations  and  balance 
sheets are collected, asymmetric  information  problems  should become 
less severe. 
The structure  of the Value  Line data  permits  an interesting  test of this 
possibility. A firm  is not added  to the data  base until  it is "of interest  to 
subscribers  and the financial  community." Once a firm  is added, how- 
ever, observations on items from its income statements and balance 
sheets are collected for at least 10 years prior  to the date it is added  to 
the Value Line data base. Most class 1 firms  were not recognized  until 
near  the end of the sample period  even though  our data  for these firms 
extend back to  1969.35 Therefore the strongest case for asymmetric 
period  t so that  the Q observed  by the firm  in formulating  the capital  spending  decision  is 
uncorrelated  with  the unanticipated  components  of the shocks. Andrew  B. Abel, Invest- 
ment and the Value of Capital (Garland  Publishing  Company, 1979); Lawrence H. 
Summers,  "Taxation  and  Corporate  Investment:  A q-Theory  Approach,"  BPEA, 1:1981, 
pp. 67-127;  Fumio  Hayashi,  "Tobin's  Marginal  q and  Average  q: A Neoclassical  Interpre- 
tation,"  Econometrica,  vol. 50 (January  1982),  pp. 213-24. 
34. Fixed time effects are included  to capture  aggregate  business-cycle  influences. 
Fixed firm  effects account  for unobserved  time-invariant  links between investment  and 
the explanatory  variables.  That  is, the "within"  effect of Q or cash flow on investment  is 
captured  by our  estimates.  Problems  of high  values  of average  Q  stemming  from  monopoly 
rents  not captured  in our  formulation  will be eliminated  by using  fixed-effects  methods  as 
long as the markup  of price over marginal  cost is constant  over the period. See Eric B. 
Lindenberg  and  Stephen  A. Ross, "Tobin's  q Ratio  and  Industrial  Organization,"  Journal 
of Business, vol. 54 (January  1981),  pp. 1-32;  Michael  A. Salinger,  "Tobin's  q, Unioniza- 
tion, and the Concentration-Profits  Relationship,"  Rand Journal  of Economics, vol. 15 
(Summer  1984),  pp. 159-70. 
35. Only 10 of the 49 firms  were in the data  base as of 1973.  By 1980,  29 firms,  over 
half the sample, were yet to be added. We thank Maria  Latorraca  of Value Line for 
providing  information  about  the procedure  used to add  firms  to the sample. Steven  M. Fazzari,  R.  Glenn Hubbard,  and Bruce  C. Petersen  167 
Table 4.  Effects of Q and Cash Flow on Investment, Various Periods,  1970-84a 
Independent 
variable  and 
summary 
statistic  Class I  Class 2  Class 3 
1970-75 
Qit  - 0.0010  0.0072  0.0014 
(0.0004)  (0.0017)  (0.0004) 
(CFIK),i  0.670  0.349  0.254 
(0.044)  (0.075)  (0.022) 
R2  0.55  0.19  0.13 
1970-79 
Qit  0.0002  0.0060  0.0020 
(0.0004)  (0.0011)  (0.0003) 
(CF/K)i,  0.540  0.313  0.185 
(0.036)  (0.054)  (0.013) 
K2  0.47  0.20  0.14 
1970-84 
Qit  0.0008  0.0046  0.0020 
(0.0004)  (0.0009)  (0.0003) 
(CF/K)i,  0.461  0.363  0.230 
(0.027)  (0.039)  (0.010) 
R2  0.46  0.28  0.19 
Source:  Authors'  estimates  of equation 3 based on a sample of firm data from Value Line data base.  See  text and 
Appendix  B. 
a.  The dependent  variable is the investment-capital  ratio (I/K)i,, where I is investment  in plant and equipment and 
K is  beginning-of-period  capital  stock.  Independent  variables  are defined  as follows:  Q is  the sum of the value  of 
equity  and  debt  less  the  value  of  inventories,  divided  by  the  replacement  cost  of  the  capital  stock  adjusted  for 
corporate and personal taxes  (see  Appendix  B); (CF/K)i, is the cash flow-capital  ratio. The equations  were estimated 
using fixed firm and year effects  (not reported).  Standard errors appear in parentheses. 
information  between firms and outside investors can be made for the 
shorter  time periods, 1970-79  and  particularly  1970-75. 
The results in table 4 show large  estimated  cash flow coefficients  for 
firms  in class 1. As expected, the cash flow coefficient  is largest  (0.670) 
in the earliest  period,  when most of these firms  had yet to be recognized 
by Value Line. The coefficient is the smallest (0.461) for 1970-84. 
Furthermore,  as the sample  period  is extended one year at a time from 
1970-75  to 1970-84, the estimated  cash flow coefficients  for these firms 
decline  monotonically.36 The cash flow coefficients  in classes 2 and  3 are 
36. The coefficients  for the periods  1970-75  through  1970-84  are:  0.670, 0.571, 0.566, 
0.554,  0.540,  0.520,  0.510,  0.494,  0.481,  and  0.461.  The  corresponding  coefficients  for  firms 
in the third  class are: 0.254, 0.176, 0.160, 0.173, 0.185, 0.204, 0.217, 0.221, 0.230, and 
0.230.  The coefficients  of firms  in class 2 always  fall in the middle. 168  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1.1988 
positive and approximately  stable over time. That the cash flow coeffi- 
cient is different  from zero even for the mature  firms  in class 3 is not 
surprising  given the limitations  of the Q model.37 
It is the difference  in the estimated  coefficients  across classes that  we 
stress. These differences  range  from  0.416  for 1970-75  to 0.231  for 1970- 
84, the smallest  difference  for  any  period  in  our  sample.  These  differences 
are always statistically  significant  at very high  confidence  levels. The t- 
statistic under  the null hypothesis that the class 1 cash flow coefficient 
equals the class 3 coefficient is 12.1 for the 1970-84 sample period, in 
which the difference is the smallest. That the difference  between the 
classes narrows  as the time period  is extended is expected; asymmetric 
information should not cause permanent differences in investment 
behavior  for ultimately  successful firms  like the ones in our sample. On 
the other hand, that the differences remain substantial for so long 
indicates  that  the phenomenon  is quite  persistent.38 
The model  explains  a greater  proportion  of the variance  of I/K in class 
1 as a result of the inclusion of cash flow. In class 1, 46 percent to 55 
percent  of the variance  in I/K is explained,  depending  on the time period 
analyzed, primarily  due to the variation  in cash flow alone. The first 
column of table 5 presents the Q model estimated without cash flow. 
Adding  cash flow increases the R2 by 0.23 for class 1, 0.11 for class 2, 
and  only 0.08 for class 3, confirming  the greater  statistical  importance  of 
cash flow for firms  in the first  class. 
Furthermore,  the economic significance  of these results  is reinforced 
by the high variability  of cash flow in the first  class. Investment  is two 
to three times more sensitive to cash flow fluctuations  in this class than 
it is in the third,  while the underlying  variations  in cash flow for the first 
37. To the extent that firms are experiencing  tax losses or are unable to take full 
advantage  of investment incentives, our tax-adjusted  Q is mismeasured.  A positive 
coefficient  on cash flow in the estimated  investment  equation  could  reflect  to some extent 
this mismeasurement  of Q. Moreover,  because  of the greater  volatility  of earnings  in firms 
in class 1, such  firms  may  be more  likely to experience  the problem.  We did  not adjust  the 
tax  measures  for  each  firm,  but  reestimating  the  models  reported  in  table  4 using  unadjusted 
q produced  virtually  identical  estimated  effects of internal  cash flow on investment. 
38. Because the firms  in the first  two classes are smaller  on average  than  those in the 
third,  one  might  expect  that  these  results  reflect  differences  due  to size rather  than  retention 
practices.  But the third  class contains  many  small  firms  as well. When  the sample  is split 
into thirds  by firm  size, as measured  by average  capital  stock, small  firms  have relatively 
low cash flow  coefficients. Steven  M. Fazzari,  R.  Glenn Hlubbard, and Bruce  C. Petersen  169 
Table 5.  Effects of Q and Cash Flow on Investment: Consideration of Measurement 
Error,  1970-84a 
Ordiiat-y 
Independent  least 
variable anid  Ordinary  squaresb 
sumlmaty  least  with  Instrumental  Fir  st  Second 
statistic  squar-esb  (CFIK)  variableb,,  differenced  differencee 
Class  I 
Qit  0.0045  0.0008  0.0065  -0.0021  -0.0040 
(0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0009)  (0.0006)  (0.0010) 
(CFIK)i,  ...  0.464  0.455  0.496  0.457 
(0.027)  (0.029)  (0.034)  (0.040) 
R2  0.23  0.46  0.53  0.25  0.22 
Class 2 
Qi,  0.0073  0.0046  0.0035  0.0106  0.0090 
(0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0011)  (0.0015)  (0.0019) 
(CFIK)i,  ...  0.363  0.418  0.268  0.364 
(0.039)  (0.038)  (0.046)  (0.054) 
R"  0.17  0.28  0.28  0.14  0.13 
Class 3 
Qi,  0.0044  0.0020  0.0024  0.0032  0.0036 
(0.0002)  (0.0003)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0005) 
(CFIK)i,  ...  0.230  0.238  0.223  0.228 
(0.010)  (0.010)  (0.013)  (0.014) 
R2  0.11  0.19  0.19  0.08  0.07 
Source: Same  as table  4. 
a. Dependent  variable  is the investment-capital  ratio  (I/K)i,.  All variables  are  as defined  in table  4, note  a. Standard 
errors  appear  in parentheses. 
b. Estimated  using  fixed  firm  and year  effects. 
c. The instrumental  variable  procedure  uses lagged  Q as an instrument  for Q. 
d. All variables  expressed  as first  differences. 
e.  All variables  expressed  as second  differences. 
class are more than three times larger than those in the third class, 
measured  by the standard  deviation  of CF/K reported  in table 2. 
ALTERNATIVE  ESTIMATION  METHODS  AND  SPECIFICATIONS  FOR 
THE  Q MODEL 
In this section, we examine  the robustness  of the results  presented  to 
this  point  for  the Q  model  with  respect  to changes  in  estimation  technique 
and specification.  There are at least two problems  in measuring  Q that 
might  affect the econometric  results for cash flow. First, to the extent 
the stock market is excessively  volatile, Q may not reflect market 
fundamentals. Second, the replacement capital stock in Q may be 
measured  with error.  The results  of tests to deal with these problems  are 170  Brookings Paper-s on Economic  Activity,  1:1988 
reported  in table 5. First, using lagged Q as an instrument  for Q, we 
obtained  similar  coefficients  on the Q and  cash flow terms.39  Second, we 
estimated the model using first differences and second differences (as 
opposed to the conventional fixed-effects, within-group  estimator) to 
address  measurement-error  problems;  coefficient  estimates  on cash flow 
are similar  in all cases.40 
Across all the tests reported  in table 5, differences  between the class 
1 and class 3 cash flow coefficients  range  between 0.217 and 0.273. This 
range  is consistent with the difference  of 0.231 estimated  with the basic 
Q model over 1970-84. If these tests are run  on earlier  time periods, the 
estimated  difference  in the cash flow effects across classes rises, but  the 
differences remain remarkably  consistent across different estimation 
techniques  for a given period. The differences  between classes 1 and 3 
for 1970-79,  for example, range  between 0.331 and 0.355. 
Table 6 reports estimates of alternative specifications to analyze 
further  the robustness  of the difference  in cash flow effects in different 
retention  classes. Results are reported  both for 1970-79 and for 1970- 
84. Some rejections  of the strongest  versions of the q theory  result  from 
a significant  effect of lagged Q in explaining  investment. The second 
model presented  in table 6 includes lagged Q. In the third  class, lagged 
Q does have a statistically significant  estimated coefficient, and the 
coefficient on the current  Q variable  becomes positive in the first  class 
when lagged Q is included.  The pattern  of cash flow coefficients across 
classes for both time periods, which is the result of primary  interest 
here, is virtually  identical  when lagged  Q is included  in the equation.41 
We also report  the effect of including  additional  lags of cash flow in 
table 6. Lagged values of cash flow may have explanatory  power for 
39. This finding  also addressed  the concern  of Fumio Hayashi  and Tohru  Inoue that 
disturbances  in the cost of adjustrnent  function  are incorporated  into the beginning-of- 
period  Q, making  Q endogenous.  Fumio  Hayashi  and  Tohru  Inoue, "Implementing  the Q 
Theory of  Investment in Micro Data: Japanese Manufacturing,  1977-1985" (Osaka 
University,  June 1987). 
40. Zvi  Griliches  and  Jerry  Hausman  argue  that  measurement  error  will  lead  to different 
biases across potential  estimators  that are similar  in that they control for firm-specific 
effects, but  differ  in their  signal-to-noise  ratios,  making  it possible  to place  bounds  on the 
importance  of measurement  error. Zvi Griliches and Jerry A. Hausman, "Errors in 
Variables  in Panel  Data,"  Jolurnal  of Econometrics,  vol. 31 (February  1986),  pp. 93-118. 
41. We also considered  the possibility  that  the adjustment  cost function  was nonlinear 
by adding  Q2 to the  equations.  This  change  did  not  materially  affect  the  cash  flow  coefficient 
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Table 6.  Effects of Q and Cash Flow on Investment: Alternative Specifications, 
Various Periods,  1970-84 a 
Independent 
variable 
and  Class I  Class 2  Class  3 
si.m4narv 
statistic  1970-79  1970-84  1970-79  1970-84  1970-79  1970-84 
Model wit/h  additional  cash  flow lags 
Qi,  -0.0002  0.0007  0.0059  0.0044  0.0011  0.0011 
(0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0011)  (0.0009)  (0.0003)  (0.0003) 
(CFIK)j,  0.508  0.400  0.245  0.304  0.146  0.168 
(0.035)  (0.029)  (0.059)  (0.045)  (0.015)  (0.012) 
(CFIK)j,-1  0.216  0.167  0.100  0.095  0.092  0.116 
(0.045)  (0.039)  (0.062)  (0.053)  (0.021)  (0.018) 
(CFIK)i,-2  0.179  0.115  0.132  0.073  0.116  0.074 
(0.043)  (0.037)  (0.063)  (0.052)  (0.020)  (0.017) 
R2  0.54  0.49  0.23  0.30  0.16  0.21 
Model includinig  lagged Q 
Qi,  0.0037  0.0033  0.0064  0.0052  0.0014  0.0015 
(0.0015)  (0.0013)  (0.0016)  (0.0014)  (0.0004)  (0.0004) 
Qi.,  ,-,  0.0011  0.0015  0.0004  - 0.0002  0.0011  0.0008 
(0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0015)  (0.0013)  (0.0004)  (0.0003) 
(CF/K)j,  0.528  0.426  0.287  0.345  0.183  0.225 
(0.041)  (0.030)  (0.059)  (0.041)  (0.014)  (0.010) 
R2  0.58  0.53  0.22  0.29  0.14  0.20 
Source:  Same  as table  4. 
a. Dependent  variable  is the investment-capital  ratio  (IIK)it.  All variables  are  as defined  in table  4, note  a. Equations 
are estimated  with  fixed  firm  and year  effects (not reported).  Standard  errors  appear  in parentheses. 
investment  in a time-to-build  context, for example. Collinearity  among 
the cash flow variables  reduces the current  cash flow coefficient in all 
classes when additional  lags are included,  but the pattern  across classes 
remains  clear. Indeed, the differences between the current  cash flow 
coefficients  in the classes 1 and 3 are almost identical  to the differences 
between the current  cash flow coefficients  in table  4. The differences  in 
the sums of the cash flow coefficients  between the first  and  third  classes 
rise substantially  when more  lags are added.42  Also the current  cash flow 
coefficient  relative to the lagged coefficients is much larger  for class 1 
than  for class 3. To the extent that  the difference  in the cash flow effects 
across classes reflects  the impact  of financial  constraints  on investment, 
42. The t-statistic  for the null hypothesis  that the sum of the cash flow coefficients  is 
equal  across the first  and third  classes is 10.6.  When  a third  lag of cash flow was included 
in the equation,  its coefficient  was not significantly  different  from zero at the 10 percent 
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one would expect the difference  to be most evident in the coefficient  on 
current  cash flow, especially  because  these data  are  annual.43  The  effects 
of the lagged  coefficients  may well reflect  shortcomings  in the empirical 
performance  of Q. That the estimated coefficient on Q for the mature 
firms  in class 3 is only half as large when longer lags on cash flow are 
included  supports  this interpretation. 
A different  interpretation  of the effect of cash flow on investment  is 
that movements  in cash flow reflect  productivity  shocks not captured  in 
the beginning-of-period  Q (that  is, cash flow may be correlated  with the 
disturbance  in the adjustment  cost function).  To explain  our  results, one 
would have to account  for the different  effect of productivity  shocks in 
firms  grouped  only by their  retention  behavior.  From  a broader  perspec- 
tive, it is also possible that current  cash flow contains "news" about 
investment  opportunities  not captured  in the beginning-of-period  Q. To 
address these points, we reestimated  the basic Q model in two ways, 
first treating CFIK as endogenous and using instrumental  variables 
techniques  and then adding  Q dated at the end of the current  period- 
that is, incorporating  all news arriving  in the current period-to  the 
ordinary  least squares  model. With  both alterations,  the differences in 
the estimated  cash flow coefficients  across classes remained.44 
In summary,  the results presented  here suggest important  effects of 
fluctuations  in the availability  of internal  finance  on investment.  Internal 
funds help explain investment in all classes, even for firms that have 
much  more  cash flow than  investment.  Most  likely, that  finding  indicates 
the pitfalls in using average Q in empirical  studies. For our purposes, 
however, the fundamental  finding  is the substantial  difference across 
classes in the effect of cash flow on investment. Several  possible issues 
involving  measurement  error  have been addressed  by instrumenting  Q 
and estimating  the basic model with first and second differences. We 
have also considered  several  alternative  specifications,  including  lagged 
Q, additional  lags of cash flow, and  treating  cash flow as endogenous. 
43. Abel and  Blanchard  consider  three  quarterly  lags of profits  in a q model  estimated 
from aggregate  data for the manufacturing  sector. This time period falls within our 
contemporaneous  annual  observation.  Abel and Blanchard  found  only the coefficient  on 
the  first  lag  of profits  to be statistically  significantly  different  from  zero.  Abel  and  Blanchard, 
"The  Present  Value  of Profits  and  Investment." 
44. The difference  in the effect of cash flow across classes generally  widened  when 
current  cash flow was instrumented  with lagged  variables.  This result  also suggests  that 
the possible  dependence  of current  cash flow  on current  investment  is not responsible  for 
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In all these models, the estimated difference  in cash flow effects in 
the different  retention  classes is always statistically  significant  at very 
high confidence levels.  Furthermore,  the estimated differentials  are 
larger  over shorter  periods  when the firms  in class 1 are less mature  and 
probably face  more severe asymmetric information  problems. The 
results over shorter  periods are also remarkably  consistent across the 
various  models  and  estimation  techniques.  For example,  the differential 
for 1970-79 between the estimated  cash flow coefficients for classes 1 
and 3 was between 0.33 and 0.38 over all the tests reported  in tables 4 
through  6. The range for 1970-75 was 0.36 to 0.42. These results are 
consistent  with  the  cost differential  between  internal  and  external  finance 
predicted  by the models described  earlier  and  with the differences  in the 
q values we found across classes. The economic importance  of these 
findings  is magnified  by the fact that cash flow is highly  variable  for the 
rapidly  growing  firms  in the first class, while mature  firms  in the third 
class experience  much  less variation  in cash flow. 
Because the firms  we examine,  even the rapidly  growing  firms  in class 
1, are  large  manufacturing  corporations  by economywide  standards,  the 
significance  of internal  finance  for capital  spending  may well be greater 
for smaller  companies, which may have more difficult,  or no, access to 
centralized  securities  markets. 
SALES  ACCELERATOR  INVESTMENT  DEMAND  MODELS 
From a theoretical  standpoint,  the Q investment  demand  model has 
many attractive  features. In practice, however, other approaches  have 
performed  better empirically. Some of the most successful empirical 
investment  models are based on the traditional  acceleration  principle, 
which  links  the demand  for capital  goods to the level or change  in a firm's 
output  or sales.45  Below we test whether  the pattern  of cash flow effects 
across retention  classes holds up in models that  include  sales. Certainly 
one possible explanation  for the effect of the cash flow variables  in all 
the retention  classes is that  internal  finance  is correlated  with sales. 
45. Traditional  accelerator  models are based on the change in sales rather  than its 
level. For a given number  of lags, this approach  imposes  one restriction  on the estimated 
coefficients. In a recent paper, Abel and Blanchard  present an accelerator  model that 
includes  delivery  and  installation  lags.  In  this  more  general  approach,  estimating  the  model 
with  levels of sales is appropriate.  Andrew  Abel and  Olivier  Blanchard,  "Investment  and 
Sales: Some Empirical  Evidence," Working  Paper  2050  (NBER, October  1986). 174  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1988 
Table 7 presents estimated  equations  for the three retention  classes 
that include cash flow and current and lagged values of sales. Two 
equations  are  reported,  one that  includes  only sales variables  augmented 
by cash flow  and  one that  adds  Q. Most  of the sales terms  are statistically 
significant  individually,  and  they are  highly  significantjointly.  Moreover, 
some of the cash flow effects in the Q model can indeed  be explained  by 
the correlation  of cash flow and sales; the cash flow coefficients  decline 
in all three classes when the sales variables  are added to the equation. 
This may indicate discrepancies between average and marginal  Q or 
accelerator effects. The pattern of the cash flow coefficients across 
classes, however, remains  about  the same  as in the models  without  sales. 
The results in table 7 are for the full 1970-84  period;  greater  estimated 
differences  in the cash flow  coefficients  arise  for shorter  sample  periods. 
The different  effects of cash flow between the classes 1 and 3 for all 
sample periods are similar  to the results obtained from the Q model 
without  sales. These results  show that  including  sales variables  does not 
change  the primary  result  presented  above. 
The  results  for  the equation  that  includes  Q  also provide  an interesting 
perspective on a point often raised in the investment literature. It is 
typical  to find  significant  effects of both sales and profits  or cash flow in 
an investment equation. In that case, however, the question remains 
whether  the cash flow variable  should be interpreted  as a signal of the 
profitability  of investment not captured  in the simple accelerator  for- 
mulation, or whether the significance of cash flow arises because it 
represents  an additional  supply  of low-cost investment  finance  for firms 
that  must  pay a premium  for external  funds. 
Including  Q in the estimated  equation  helps to resolve this question. 
Because Q is based on asset prices determined in forward-looking 
markets, it should capture the prospective profitability  of investment 
better  than  lags  of past  profits.  The  results  show that  including  Q  reduces 
the cash flow effect somewhat  in classes 2 and 3, but cash flow still has 
a strong  effect in all the dividend-payout  classes. To the extent that Q 
captures  the effect of future  profitability  on the demand  for investment, 
this result supports  the financing  constraint  interpretation.  Again, that 
the cash flow effect remains  significant  in the class of high-payout  firms 
suggests  caution  in this regard.  The  difference in cash flow  effects across 
classes remains  the strongest  evidence supporting  the finance  constraint 
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Table 7.  Effects of Sales and Cash Flow on Investment,  1970-84a 
Independent 
variable  and 
summarv 
statistic  Class 1  Class 2  Class 3 
Model with sales-capital ratio 
(CFIK)i,  0.277  0.256  0.120 
(0.033)  (0.047)  (0.013) 
(SIK)i,  0.041  0.045  0.027 
(0.007)  (0.009)  (0.002) 
(SIK)j,  - I  - 0.015  -  0.016  -0.001 
(0.011)  (0.011)  (0.003) 
(S1K)j,,  2  0.031  0.015  0.008 
(0.012)  (0.011)  (0.003) 
(SIK)i,,-  3  - 0.036  -  0.020  -  0.010 
(0.009)  (0.008)  (0.003) 
)R2  0.54  0.30  0.23 
Model with sales-capital ratio and Q 
Qit  -  0.0004  0.0049  0.0019 
(0.0004)  (0.0009)  (0.0003) 
(CF/K);,  0.286  0.178  0.086 
(0.035)  (0.047)  (0.013) 
(S/K)i,  0.042  0.047  0.029 
(0.007)  (0.009)  (0.002) 
(SIK)j,,  - 1-0.013  -0.021  -0.003 
(0.011)  (0.011)  (0.003) 
(SWO  - 2  0.029  0.015  0.008 
(0.012)  (0.011)  (0.003) 
(SIK)i, 3  -  0.036  -0.012  -  0.009 
(0.009)  (0.008)  (0.003) 
R2  0.54  0.34  0.24 
Source: Authors'  calculations  based  on a sample  of firm  data  from  Value  Line  data  base. See text description  and 
Appendix  B. 
a. The dependenit  variable  is the investment-capital  ratio (I/K)i,  defined  as in table 4, note a. Q and (CFIK)it  are 
also as defined  in table  4, note a. (S/K)i, is the ratio  of sales, S, to the beginning-of-period  capital  stock. All equations 
were estimated  with  fixed  time  and  firm  effects (not reported).  Standard  errors  appear  in parentheses. 
INTERNAL  FINANCE  IN  THE  NEOCLASSICAL  INVESTMENT 
MODEL 
A common  criticism  of the sales accelerator  model is that it does not 
incorporate  the  relative  price  of capital  or  capital  services  in the  empirical 
specification. This issue is addressed by the neoclassical investment 176  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1988 
model pioneered  by Jorgenson.46  In its most general  form, the neoclas- 
sical model is derived from the solution to a dynamic factor demand 
problem that determines the firm's optimal level of capital services 
through  time. The change  in the demand  for capital  services along with 
the depreciation  of existing capital  determines  investment. 
With perfectly competitive input and output markets, the firm's 
optimal  demand  for capital services depends ultimately  on the price of 
output and the relative prices of various inputs, including  the cost of 
capital. To simplify the empirical specification, however, Jorgenson 
used a transformation  of the reduced form of the optimal  demand  for 
capital  based on a Cobb-Douglas  production  function. The transforma- 
tion allows the demand  for capital  to be expressed as a function of the 
relative  cost of capital  services alone; the effect of other  factor  prices is 
captured  by including  the level of output or sales in the model. In this 
case, the neoclassical  model  with partial-adjustment  assumptions  takes 
a form similar  to the accelerator  model, except that the sales or output 
term  is modified  by a cost of capital  measure.  If firms  have  Cobb-Douglas 
production  functions, the desired capital stock is proportional  to the 
ratio  of sales to the tax-adjusted  relative  price of capital.47  This variable 
is denoted  by J in table 8. 
The first  equation  in table 8 includes  the cost of capital  and cash flow 
variables.  Again, the pattern  of coefficients  across the retention  classes 
shows that cash flow has a substantially  higher  effect for firms  that pay 
low dividends than for mature, high-payout  firms. The neoclassical 
model  is subject  to the same  criticism  that  is raised  against  the accelerator 
model:  the equation  is specified  with backward-looking  variables.  How- 
ever, adding tax-adjusted  Q to the equation, as we do in the second 
equation  reported  in table 8, does not change  the results substantially. 
Though not reported here, we have also estimated the investment 
equations  outlined  before with instrumental  variables  for Q, cash flow, 
and  sales to attempt  to correct  for "news" in cash flow  and  measurement 
error  problems. The results depend on the specific instruments  used, 
46. For a survey  of much  of the relevant  literature,  see Dale W. Jorgenson,  "Econo- 
metric  Studies  of Investment  Behavior:  A Survey,"  Journal  of Economic  Literature,  vol. 
9 (December  1971),  pp. 1  1  11-47;  and  Clark,  "Investment  in the 1970s.  " 
47. The general  form  of the tax adjustments  to cost of capital  we use in the empirical 
work presented  here is based on the original  development  by Hall and Jorgenson,  "Tax 
Policy." The cost of capital  definition  is presented  in Appendix  B. Steven  M. Fazzari,  R.  Glenn Hubbard,  and Bruce  C. Petersen  177 
Table 8.  Effects of Cost of Capital and Cash Flow on Investment, 1970-84a 
Independent 
variable  and 
summary 
statistic  Class 1  Class 2  Class 3 
Model with adjusted  sales-cost of capital ratio 
(CFIK)i,  0.337  0.331  0.199 
(0.029)  (0.043)  (0.011) 
(JIK)it  0.273  0.177  0.081 
(0.043)  (0.039)  (0.009) 
(JIK:)  i-,  t  I-0.100  -0.070  -0.023 
(0.072)  (0.055)  (0.012) 
(JIK:)i,t-2  0.152  0.046  0.025 
(0.079)  (0.057)  (0.013) 
(JIK)i  t-3  -0.123  -  0.069  0.002 
(0.060)  (0.044)  (0.010) 
k2  0.52  0.28  0.20 
Model with adjusted  sales-cost of capital ratio and Q 
Qit  0.0005  0.0050  0.0020 
(0.0004)  (0.0009)  (0.0003) 
(CFIK)i,  0.319  0.248  0.163 
(0.033)  (0.044)  (0.011) 
(JIK)it  0.275  0.190  0.086 
(0.043)  (0.038)  (0.009) 
(JIK:)i.  -,  1-0.114  -0.090  -0.030 
(0.073)  (0.053)  (0.012) 
(JIK:)i,t-2  0.158  0.051  0.026 
(0.079)  (0.055)  (0.012) 
(JIK)i,t  - 3  -0.125  -- 0.037  0.003 
(0.060)  (0.043)  (0.010) 
R2  0.53  0.32  0.21 
Source:  Same as table 7. 
a.  The  equations  are as  specified  in table  7 except  that the  sales  ter-m used  in table  7 is  modified by  a cost  of 
capital measure (see  text).  The variable,  defined J,  enters  the equations  above  as a ratio to the capital stock  at the 
beginning of the period,  K.  All equations  were  estimated  with fixed  time and firm effects  (not reported).  Standard 
errors appear in parentheses. 
but several  general  features  of the estimates  are clear. First, the pattern 
of declining  cash flow coefficients as one moves to the higher  payout 
classes remains.  The differential  between classes 1 and 3 is generally  at 
least as large  as in the reported  results. Second, the cash flow effects in 
class 3 remain  as large  as or  larger  than  in the OLS/fixed-effect  equations. 
Therefore, no simple correction for measurement  error resolves the 
puzzle of why cash flow has a persistent  effect for mature  firms  in each 
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Regardless of the conclusion reached about the source of cash flow 
effects in mature  firms,  however, the difference  in the cash flow effects 
reported  here establishes  that  firm  heterogeneity  is an important  aspect 
of the link  between finance  and  real investment. 
INVESTMENT  EQUATIONS  AT  THE  INDUSTRY  LEVEL 
Another dimension  of firm  heterogeneity  that may be important  for 
investment behavior  is differences across industry categories. Table 9 
provides estimates of the basic Q model augmented  with cash flow by 
retention class for several two-digit Standard  Industrial  Classification 
(SIC) code manufacturing  industry  categories. The results  reported  are 
robust to the alternative  investment demand specifications reviewed 
before. The number  of observations  in classes 1 and 2 is small in the 
separate  industry  categories. We have reported  estimates  for these two 
classes combined  for individual  two-digit industries  that have at least 
five firms in the combined class. For comparison, we also report the 
estimated coefficients for the model from a sample that combines the 
remaining  two-digit  industries. 
In six out of the seven cases, the cash flow effect is larger  for the high- 
retention classes than for the more mature firms in class 3. That the 
effect of cash flow on investment  is greatest  for low-payout  firms,  with 
industry effects held constant, casts further doubt on a productivity 
shock interpretation  of the differential  effect. Because of the small 
samples, the differentials  vary substantially.  The one case (chemicals, 
industry  28)  in which  the cash flow coefficient  for the third  class is higher 
than  that  for the first  two classes has only two firms  from  the first  class, 
the lowest number  for any industry  group. These results indicate that 
greater  sensitivity of investment  to cash flow in high-retention  firms  is 
not a phenomenon  restricted  to particular  industries.  The high-technol- 
ogy computer  firms  in industry  36 have a high  differential,  for example, 
but the differential  in the food-processing  firms  in industry  20 is even 
greater. 
BALANCE  SHEETS,  INTERNAL  FINANCE,  AND  INVESTMENT 
The results  presented  to this point have examined  how changes  in the 
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Table  9. Effects  of Q and Cash  Flow on Investment,  Various  Industries,  1970-84a 
Standard 
Industrial 
Classifi-  Classes I and 2  Class 3 
cation 
Industry  code  Q  CFIK  R2  Q  CFIK  R2 
Food  20  -0.003  0.613  0.19  0.007  0.247  0.14 
(0.008)  (0.135)  (0.002)  (0.054) 
Chemicals  28  0.006  0.190  0.36  -0.001  0.413  0.28 
(0.001)  (0.068)  (0.001)  (0.036) 
Machinery,  except  35  0.000  0.545  0.59  0.014  0.280  0.42 
electrical  (0.001)  (0.041)  (0.002)  (0.039) 
Electrical  and elec-  36  0.002  0.293  0.21  0.000  0.207  0.27 
tronic  machinery  (0.001)  (0.045)  (0.001)  (0.022) 
Transportation  37  0.008  0.401  0.62  0.019  0.161  0.27 
(0.002)  (0.053)  (0.003)  (0.054) 
Measuring  instruments  38  0.006  0.457  0.29  0.003  0.349  0.47 
(0.002)  (0.108)  (0.001)  (0.047) 
All others  0.011  0.394  0.34  0.003  0.191  0 14 
(0.003)  (0.056)  (0.001)  (0.017) 
Source:  Same as table 4. 
a.  For each industry the equations are exactly  the same as the equations in table 4, except  that the firms in classes 
I and 2 are aggregated. All equations  were estimated  with fixed firm and year effects  (not reported).  Standard errors 
are in parentheses. 
firms.  Of course, stock measures  of a firm's  internal  liquidity  might  also 
have an effect on investment for firms  that face high costs of external 
funds  due to information  problems  in capital  markets.  Cash  and  market- 
able securities  provide  a low-cost source of investment  finance  for firms 
that must pay a premium  for external funds. To the extent that such 
firms  have accumulated  liquid  resources, they have a financial  cushion 
that may reduce the sensitivity of their  investment  to cash flow fluctua- 
tions. Therefore,  one might  expect to observe a positive effect of stock 
measures  of liquidity  for the high-retention  firms, whose investment  is 
especially sensitive to fluctuations  in cash flow. 
The motivation  for this test is analogous  to considerations  of precau- 
tionary  saving. If managers  know that they will have to pay a premium 
for external  funds, they should  accumulate  a stock of liquid  assets when 
cash flow is high.  That  stock of liquid  assets will help smooth  investment 
over downturns  and spare firms the need to obtain potentially costly 
capital from external sources. It might also provide the necessary 
collateral to obtain new debt as  suggested by some of the models 




statistic  Class  I  Class 2  Class 3 
Model  including cash  and equivalents  variable 
Qit  0.0001  0.0045  0.0019 
(0.0004)  (0.0009)  (0.0003) 
(CF/K)i,  0.372  0.348  0.224 
(0.027)  (0.039)  (0.011) 
(CASH/K)i,  0.112  0.052  0.010 
(0.011)  (0.020)  (0.007) 
R2  0.53  0.30  0.19 
Model inicluding working capital 
Qit  0.0003  0.0043  0.0021 
(0.0004)  (0.0009)  (0.0003) 
(CF/K)i,  0.365  0.351  0.230 
(0.030)  (0.039)  (0.010) 
(WCMI/K)i,  0.077  0.021  -  0.011 
(0.011)  (0.015)  (0.006) 
R2  0.51  0.29  0.19 
Model  including curri-ent  and lagged  values 
of cashi and sales 
Qit  -  0.0005  0.0042  0.0012 
(0.0004)  (0.0009)  (0.0003) 
(CASH/K)i,  0.099  0.058  0.000 
(0.011)  (0.020)  (0.008) 
(CFIK),t  0.163  0.119  -  0.005 
(0.036)  (0.054)  (0.016) 
(CF/K)i,1  0.168  0.089  0.153 
(0.044)  (0.061)  (0.022) 
(CFIK)i,  2  0.071  0.002  0.091 
(0.047)  (0.059)  (0.020) 
(SIK)i,  0.044  0.053  0.038 
(0.007)  (0.009)  (0.003) 
(SIK)i,  tl-  I  -  0.035  -  0.032  -  0.017 
(0.012)  (0.012)  (0.004) 
(S/K)-  2  0.026  0.018  0.001 
(0.014)  (0.012)  (0.004) 
(SIK)i,t-3  -  0.020  -  0.015  -  0.005 
(0.010)  (0.009)  (0.003) 
R2  0.60  0.35  0.26 
Source:  Same as table 7. 
a.  The dependent  variable is the investment-capital  ratio (I/K)it, where I is investment  in plant and equipment and 
K is beginning-of-period  capital stock.  Qi, is the sum of the value  of equity  and debt less  the value  of inventories, 
divided  by the  replacement  cost  of  the capital  stock  adjusted for corporate  and personal  taxes  (see  Appendix  B); 
(CFIK)i, is  the  cash  flow-capital  ratio; (SIK)it is  the  ratio of  sales  to  capital;  CASH  is  cash  on  hand plus  liquid 
securities;  and  WCMI is working capital less  the book value of inventories.  Standard errors appear in parentheses. Steven M. Fazzari, R. Glenn  Hubbard,  and Bruce C. Petersen  181 
nants and restrictions that constrain firms' ability to use stocks of 
liquidity.  Thus, when  financially  constrained  firms  experience  increased 
liquidity,  they may be able to finance  increased  investment. 
On  the other  hand,  mature  firms  that  pay a substantial  portion  of their 
income as dividends are unlikely to derive any particular  benefit for 
investment  from higher  stocks of liquid  assets. If retained  earnings  fall 
below the level necessary to finance  desired investment  in these firms, 
they could reduce dividends, or, if managers  perceive dividend  cuts as 
negative signals to the market,  they could likely obtain relatively low- 
cost funds from external  capital  markets.  Therefore,  one would expect 
little estimated  significance  for stock measures  of liquidity  in the invest- 
ment  of the high-dividend  firms  in our third  class. 
Table 10 reports  the results of including  stock liquidity  measures in 
an augmented  Q investment  equation  similar  to the equations  presented 
earlier. We used two alternative  liquidity stock variables-cash  and 
equivalents  (defined  as cash on hand  plus securities  readily  convertible 
into  cash), CASH,  and  working  capital  less the book value  of inventories, 
WCMI,  where  working  capital  is defined  as current  assets minus  current 
liabilities.  Both variables  were measured  at the beginning  of the period 
and  were deflated  by the firm's  capital  stock. The results  clearly  support 
the view that changes in balance sheet positions and liquidity have a 
significant  effect on investment  for the low-payout  firms. On the other 
hand, the estimated coefficients on the liquidity variables are not 
statistically  different  from zero for the mature  firms.  The results  for the 
firms in class 2 fall in the middle. These results are also remarkably 
robust  in equations  that  include  sales accelerator  variables  (not  reported 
here). As discussed, the cash flow coefficients drop for all the classes 
when lags of sales are included. The coefficients on the stock liquidity 
variables,  however, are virtually  identical  in models that include sales. 
Similar  results were obtained  when we included  current  assets alone or 
working  capital  alone without  subtracting  inventories. 
It is not especially surprising  that the results across classes are so 
strong for the liquidity  variables  from the balance sheet. Cash flow is 
closely correlated  with profits,  and  to the extent that  there  are problems 
with the Q model or other  investment  demand  specifications,  one would 
expect cash flow to enter an investment equation positively, even for 
mature, high-dividend  firms that are unlikely to face important  cost 
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liquidity are less  likely to indicate much about profitability  of new 
investment.  The evidence supports  the hypothesis that these variables 
have no important  effect for firms  like the ones in our class 3 sample. 
For firms  in classes 1 and 2, however, the results using balance sheet 
variables present strong evidence of the imperfect substitutability  of 
internal  and external  finance  at the margin. 
We have examined the robustness of these results to alternative 
specifications.  Because we have only current  cash flow in the reported 
regressions, the estimated liquidity effects may be proxies for longer 
lags of cash flow, or they could capture  accelerator  effects of sales. To 
test this possibility,  we included  current  and  three  lagged  values of cash 
flow and sales in the model. The results are reported  in the last half of 
table 10. The effects of these additional variables were statistically 
significant,  but the pattern  of estimated coefficients for the cash-and- 
equivalents  and working-capital-less-inventories  variables  are virtually 
identical  to the patterns  found  in the models  without  sales or lags of cash 
flow. 
INTERNAL  FINANCE  AND  INVESTMENI  IN  lIlGH-PAYOUT  FIRMS 
In some specifications  of the investment  models presented  here, the 
estimated coefficient on cash flow is both statistically significant  and 
economically  important  for the high-payout  firms  in class 3. This finding 
was quite  robust.  We tried  further  splits  of those firms  based on the level 
of payout  rates  over the sample.  We also divided  those firms  into groups 
based on dividend  growth,  rather  than  levels, to test the hypothesis  that 
investment  of firms  that  increase  their  dividends  would be less sensitive 
to cash  flow  than  firms  that  paid  stable  or  falling  dividends.  The  estimated 
cash flow coefficients  for these subgroups  were roughly  the same as the 
estimated  coefficients  from  the full class 3 sample. 
Because class 3 firms  pay substantial  dividends, such findings  may 
seem inconsistent  with our  emphasis  on the imperfect  substitutability  of 
internal  and external  finance. That  is, if external  funds are more costly 
than internal  finance, why would these firms not cut dividends rather 
than investment  when cash flow falls? One explanation  is that agency 
costs of internal  finance  (that is, potential "managerial  waste" on less 
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investment in mature firms.48  While these agency problems may be 
important,  they do not seem to explain the entire cash flow effect for 
class 3 firms.  The class 3 cash flow effect is small  when sales variables 
are  included,  suggesting  that  the apparent  correlation  between cash flow 
and investment in mature  firms may be due to the omission of output 
terms important  in reconciling the difference between marginal  and 
average Q. Nor is there any measured effect of beginning-of-period 
stocks of liquidity  on investment  in these firms. 
Furthermore,  evidence of "'sticky"  dividends suggests that, in the 
presence of even small cost differentials  between internal  and external 
finance,  investment  may  be sensitive to internal  finance  for mature  firms 
with substantial  payout.49  If these firms are reluctant  to cut dividends 
when cash flow falls, maybe for signaling  reasons, they may reduce 
investment somewhat rather than seek more costly external finance. 
This kind of behavior would, of course, magnify the importance of 
financial  constraints  for macroeconomic  fluctuations  in investment, a 
possibility  that should  be considered  in more  depth  in future  research. 
Conclusions  and Applications 
Our results show that financial  factors affect investment. Our ap- 
proach emphasizes that the link between financing constraints and 
investment varies by type of firm. Recent literature  on asymmetric 
information  and  capital  market  imperfections  demonstrates  that  a firm's 
opportunity  cost of internal  funds can be substantially  lower than its 
cost of external  finance. Under these circumstances,  the investment  of 
firms  that exhaust nearly all of their low-cost internal  funds should be 
more sensitive to fluctuations  in their cash flow than that of firms  that 
pay high dividends. Also,  liquidity should have a greater effect on 
investment  for low-dividend  firms  than  for high-dividend  firms. 
48. For a discussion of the agency costs associated with "free cash flows" in the 
petroleum  industry,  see Michael  C. Jensen, "Agency  Costs  of Free  Cash  Flow, Corporate 
Finance,  and Takeovers,"  American Economic  Reviewv, vol.  76 (May 1986, Papers  and 
Proceedings,  1985), pp. 323-29. 
49. See, for example, the review of studies presented  in James M. Poterba, "Tax 
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To test these hypotheses, we estimated  investment  functions  across 
groups of firms  classified  by their dividend  behavior. Financial  effects 
were generally important  for investment in all firms. But the results 
consistently indicated  a substantially  greater sensitivity of investment 
to cash flow and liquidity  in firms  that retain  nearly  all of their  income. 
This statistically  and  economically  significant  difference  was robust  to a 
wide variety of model specifications  and estimation  techniques. It was 
largest for sample periods in which the low-dividend firms were the 
youngest and had yet to be recognized  by major  financial  data services. 
These empirically  important  differences  across firms  are  consistent  with 
financial constraints arising from capital market imperfections. The 
results also cast doubt on the longstanding  interpretation  of empirical 
financial  effects on investment  as proxies for misspecified  "real" influ- 
ences. 
If capital market  imperfections  lead to binding  financial  constraints 
on investment, several important  implications arise for the study of 
macroeconomic  investment  fluctuations  and  the impact  of public  policy 
on capital spending.  We consider these points briefly, as well as some 
suggested  directions  for future  research,  in the remainder  of the paper. 
INTERNAL  FINANCE,  INVESTMENT,  AND  ECONOMIC 
FLUCTUATIONS 
Financial  constraints  in capital markets  can magnify  the macroeco- 
nomic effect of shocks to cash flow or liquidity  that reduce some firms' 
access to low-cost finance  and  worsen their  balance sheet positions. To 
examine  this  issue more  closely, we consider  the extent to which  internal 
finance  effects on investment  can account  for the variability  of aggregate 
investment. Since 1970, the standard  deviation of the ratio of nonresi- 
dential  gross investment  to the replacement  value of the stock of plant 
and equipment has been 0.87 percent (with a mean value of  12.46 
percent). How much  of this variance  can be explained  by our estimated 
effect of changes  in cash flow in investment? 
From the investment model estimated  from the full sample with Q, 
current  cash flow, and lags of sales, the cash flow coefficients for the 
dividend  classes 1 through  3 are 0.309, 0.167, and 0.085, respectively. 
We make the conservative assumptions  that the effect of cash flow for 
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constraints,  and  that  the portion  of the class 1 and  2 coefficients  equal  to 
the class 3 coefficient should  be attributed  to effects other than finance 
constraints.  Then the net cash flow effects for classes 1 and 2 are 0.224 
and  0.082, respectively.  The predicted  changes  in the investment-capital 
ratio  resulting  from  a one standard  deviation  change in the cash flow to 
capital ratios are 4.48 and 0.74 percentage  points for classes 1 and 2, 
respectively. 
The  aggregate  investment-capital  ratio  can  be expressed  as a weighted 
average  of the ratio  for each class, with weights equal to the proportion 
of the aggregate  capital  stock in each class. To predict  the effect of cash 
flow changes for firms like those in classes  1 and 2 for aggregate 
investment  fluctuations,  therefore,  one needs to estimate  the proportion 
of the aggregate  capital  stock in similar  firms.  We begin very conserva- 
tively by assuming  that the aggregate  proportions  are the same as our 
Value Line sample  proportions.  Then, one standard  deviation  changes 
in the class 1 and 2 cash-flow-to-capital  ratios explain about 13 percent 
of the standard  deviation  in the aggregate  investment-capital  ratio. 
This result, however, almost certainly understates the true effect 
because large, mature  firms  constitute  a greater  proportion  of our  Value 
Line sample than they do of the aggregate  economy. Indeed, data for 
our sample  period from the  Quarterly Financial  Reports  of  the  U.S. 
Department  of Commerce indicate that approximately  20 percent of 
aggregate  assets are  held  by firms  with  total  assets less than  $100  million. 
The median capital stock figure for our Value Line firms in class 1, 
certainly less than their total assets, was $95 million in 1984. Class 2 
firms  had a median  capital stock of $193 million. These statistics imply 
that the aggregate importance  of firms  as small as or smaller  than our 
class 1 and class 2 firms  is much greater  than our sample proportions 
would indicate, and the 13 percent figure  derived above may well be a 
loose lower bound. The aggregate  retention  data also suggest that low- 
dividend  firms  are much  more  numerous  and  account  for a much  greater 
fraction  of investment  and  capital  in the economy as a whole than  in our 
Value Line sample. Firms with assets less than $100 million retained 
about  77 percent  of their  income. Therefore,  the part  of a representative 
aggregate  shock to investment that could be explained by the kind of 
financial effects estimated here could be  substantial, and financing 
constraints  could account for a large  proportion  of the aggregate  varia- 
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further  impetus to research that links aggregate  economic fluctuations 
to problems  in financial  markets. 
FINANCE  CONSTRAINTS,  INVESTMENT,  AND  TAX  POLICY 
Most studies of the effects of tax policy on investment  assume that 
firms respond to prices set in centralized securities markets, such as 
market  interest rates on Tobin's q, and that the availability  of finance 
does not limit  investment.  The implications  for tax policy are  clear:  what 
matters  for investment is the marginal  tax rate on returns  from a new 
project,  not the firm's  average  tax burden  on returns  from  its investments 
in place. As we have emphasized,  however, for firms  that  face imperfect 
markets  for external finance, it is not sufficient  to focus solely on the 
cost of funds determined  in centralized securities markets. For these 
firms,  the amount  of earnings  devoted  to taxes, and  therefore  the  average 
tax rate on returns from existing projects, matters for investment, 
possibly along with incentive effects of marginal  tax rates. Thus, the 
cash flow effects of changes  in the investment  tax credit  or depreciation 
allowances may be more important  for many firms  than the associated 
cost of capital  effects of such policies.50 
That average tax rates matter for some firms does not, however, 
necessarily  imply  a policy opportunity.  To the extent that  policymakers 
can  distinguish  project  types no better  than  private  financiers,  the  lemons 
problem  remains.  An  additional  concern  relates  to agency  issues. Policies 
that  increase  internal  finance  might  encourage  managers  concerned,  for 
example,  with  corporate  size as well as the value  of shareholders'  claims 
to overinvest.51  Nevertheless, understanding  the impact  of public poli- 
50. These  issues are  considered  in greater  detail  in Steven  Fazzari,  R. Glenn  Hubbard, 
and Bruce Petersen, "Investment, Financing  Decisions, and Tax Policy," American 
Economic Review, vol. 78 (May 1988, Papers and Proceedings,  1987),  pp. 200-05. 
51. At first  glance, our finding  that  internal  finance  influences  investment  spending  in 
addition  to q, especially  in firms  with low payout, could be consistent  with a managerial 
waste hypothesis:  available  internal  finance  is invested  in projects  at levels not  justified  by 
market  signals  alone. Our  results  show, however,  that  it is rapidly  growing  firms  with  high 
q values, not large, mature  or declining  firms, that have low average payout and the 
greatest  sensitivity  of investment  to the supply  of internal  funds. Therefore,  tax changes 
that increase internal  cash flow and liquidity  could lead to higher  levels of productive 
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cies  on investment through their effect on internal finance can be 
important.  As an example,  asymmetric  information  problems  reduce  the 
likelihood  that households  can "pierce the corporate  veil." Redistribu- 
tions of funds away from firms, either to shareholders  or to taxpayers, 
may change  both the level of investment  and its allocation  to the extent 
that  firms  face information-related  finance  constraints. 
FURTHER  EXTENSIONS  AND  LINKS  TO  OTHER  CURRENT 
RESEARCH 
The link between the financial  influences on investment and infor- 
mation imperfections in capital markets suggests that research on 
"information  capital" accumulation  through  financial  intermediation  is 
important  for understanding  the investment  process. One  channel  through 
which information  capital can be accumulated  is financial  institutions 
that  specialize  in long-term  borrower  relationships  and  in the evaluation 
of balance sheet positions. These institutions  can figure  prominently  in 
the finance  of smaller  firms  lacking  cost-effective access to commercial 
paper,  bond,  and  equity  markets.  Also, venture  capitalists  can  be viewed 
as  specialists in the accumulation of information  on balance sheet 
positions  and  investment  prospects  in  growing  enterprises.  The  existence 
of a lemons  premium  in equity  issues does not, however, imply  that  large 
arbitrage  profits  exist, where any cash-rich  firm  or individual  could buy 
a constrained  firm. Rather, "profits" arise from the costly activity of 
investigating  and  overcoming  information  asymmetries. 
The existence of finance  constraints  has implications  for research  in 
industrial  organization.  Kenneth  Judd  and  Petersen  argue,  for example, 
that large differentials  in the cost of internal  and external finance can 
rationalize  predatory  and  limit-pricing  strategies.  In  addition,  interesting 
evidence provided by David Ravenscraft  and F. M. Scherer supports 
the view that many  mergers  appear  to match  different  corporations  that 
face different  costs of capital  on the margin.52  Such combinations  would 
52. Kenneth  L. Judd  and Bruce C. Petersen, "Dynamic  Limit Pricing  and Internal 
Finance," Journal of Economic Theory, vol.  39 (April 1986), pp. 268-99; David J. 
Ravenscraft and F. M. Scherer, Mergers, Sell-Offs, and Economic Efficiency (Brookings, 
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permit  reallocations  of capital  that bypass capital  markets.  This possi- 
bility suggests other research questions, some which have been ad- 
dressed  by Ravenscraft  and  Scherer.  Do mergers  of companies  in related 
activities perform  better than purely conglomerate  mergers, and if so, 
are the reasons information-related?  How do young firms that are 
independent perform relative to those acquired by cash-rich mature 
companies?  Similarly,  how do start-up  ventures  of cash-rich  companies 
perform  relative  to independent  start-up  ventures? 
Our  empirical  results on firm  investment  suggest that models should 
address  links  between net worth  and  credit  allocation  and  the possibility 
of precautionary  retentions by many firms. Theoretical research is 
proceeding  along  these lines.53 
Future  research  should  consider  the role of internal  finance  in invest- 
ment  decisions in other  countries,  examining  differences  in tax policies, 
the structure  of capital  markets,  and  organization  of firms.  A particularly 
interesting  topic would  be the analysis  of differences  in the sensitivity  of 
investment  to internal  finance  according  to the extent to which lenders 
participate  in corporate  decisionmaking.  Research  in these areas is just 
beginning, but the importance  of internal finance for investment has 
been confirmed  using  firm  data  for Japan  and  for the United Kingdom.54 
These results  are  also relevant  to debates  over the source  of aggregate 
fluctuations.  The importance  of firm heterogeneity  in capital markets 
suggests  that  representative  agent, real  business-cycle models, in which 
financial  factors are irrelevant  and productivity shocks drive macro- 
economic movements, are not likely to be adequate descriptions of 
cyclical  fluctuations.  On  a formal  level, models  should  consider  channels 
through  which exogenous shocks are magnified  by information  imper- 
fections in capital  markets. 
53. Roger  E. A. Farmer,  "A New Theory  of Aggregate  Supply,"  American  Economic 
Review,  vol. 74  (December  1984),  pp.  920-30;  Bernanke  and  Gertler,  "Financial  Fragility"; 
Calomiris  and  Hubbard,  "Firm  Heterogeneity";  Bruce  Greenwald  and  Joseph  E. Stiglitz, 
"Information,  Finance  Constraints,  and Business Fluctuations"  (Princeton  University, 
1986). 
54. Takeo  Hoshi, Anil  K. Kashyap,  and  David  Scharfstein,  "Corporate  Structure  and 
Investment:  Evidence from Japanese  Panel Data" (MIT, May 1988);  Richard  Blundell, 
Stephen  Bond, Michael  Devereux, and Fabio Schiantarelli,  "Does Q Matter  for Invest- 
ment?  Some Evidence  from  a Panel  of U.K. Companies,"  Working  Paper  8712  (London: 
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APPENDIX  A 
Dividends, Investment, and Q under Alternative 
Financing Regimes 
WE BEGIN  with a simple model of equity finanice,  dividends,  and invest- 
ment.55  In tax-based  models, there  are  differences  in the costs of internal 
and external  finance  because of the differential  taxation  of capital  gains 
and dividends  at the personal  level. In any period t, an existing share- 
holder's  after-tax  return  Rt  is the sum of a dividend  return  (taxed  at rate 
0) and  a capital  gain  (taxed at an accrual-equivalent  rate c), so that 
(A.1)  R  (1 -  O)Dt  +  (1 -  c)(tVt+1 -  Vt) 
Vt 
where  Dt represents  the dividend  payment  by the firm,  Vt  is the value of 
the firm's equity, and tVt+1  is the value in period t +  I of the shares 
outstanding  in period  t. In period  t +  1, the total value of the firm  is 
(A.2)  Vt+1 =  tV+1  +  V, 
where VtN  represents  new share  issues. 
In equilibrium,  owners of equity  earn  their  required  return  p, so that 
(A.3)  pVt =  (I-O)Dt  -  (1-c)VN  +  (1-c)Vt+1  -  (l-c)Vt. 
and  the value of the firm  is given by 
(A.4)  v  '  =  +  1c)  L(1-Dt+c  ] 
That is, the total value of the firm  is the present value of the posttax 
dividend  stream  adjusted  for the present value of new share  issues that 
would have to be bought by current  equity holders to maintain  their 
proportional  claim  on the firm. 
55. See the discussions  in Alan J. Auerbach,  "Taxes, Firm  Financial  Policy and the 
Cost  of Capital:  An Empirical  Analysis,  " Journal  ofPublic  Economics,  vol. 23  (February- 
March  1984),  pp. 27-57; and  Poterba  and Summers,  "The Economic  Effects of Dividend 
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To take into account  the lemons premium  associated  with new equity 
issues, as we discussed in the text, we reduce V in equation  A.4 by an 
amount  fl per dollar  of new equity issued. That  is, 
(A.5)  Vt = E  I  +  1  Dt+  i -  (1 + Q,+  j)  VN, i 
The firm maximizes its market value subject to a set of four con- 
straints. 
-Capital  accumulation:  Kt  =  (1  -  8)Kt-1  +  It, where  Kt is  the 
capital stock at the end of period t, I represents investment, and 8 
represents  a constant  rate  of depreciation. 
-Sources  equal uses offuinds: (1  -  T)-rr(Kt)  +  VN =  Dt +  It, where 
r(K)  represents  pretax  profits  and  T  is the corporate  income tax rate. 
-Dividends:  Dt ?  0. 
-New  share issues:  Vt  N  VN; that is, new share  issues are assumed 
to be bounded  from  below by some minimum  (negative)  level, VN. 
In summary,  the firm  chooses 1, K, VN,  and D so as to maximize V 
subject  to the constraints  described  above. That  is, 
Ec (t  P  )  I  "{(1o)  (A.  6)  max  E(I  + iC  t1j(2  Dt - (1 +  ?t)  Vt1 
- AtKt  -  (1-6)Kt-  Iit 
-(t  (I  -- T)T(Kt)  +  VN  -  D-  It] 
-  It(VN  -  VA) -  yt D, 
where X, a,  3, -y are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the 
constraints. 
The solution  for the case where internal  finance  exceeds investment 
is familiar.  In that  case, if the dividend  tax rate  exceeds the capital  gains 
tax rate (0>c), it is never optimal  to issue new shares  and  pay dividends 
at the same time. Abstracting  from corporate  tax considerations, the 
equilibrium  value of an additional  unit of capital-marginal q-is  equal 
to (1 -  0)/(1 -  c). This is the q value at which shareholders are indifferent 
between a dollar  of retentions  reinvested  in the firm  and  taxed at rate c, 
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New shares are issued only when internal  finance is exhausted and 
the marginal  q on additional  projects exceeds  1  + f.  The range of q 
values over which firms  neither  pay dividends  nor issue new shares  can 
be derived  as follows. When  firms  are not paying  dividends  and internal 
finance  is exhausted,  we know that t  =  0 and 
(A.7)  (Xt  =-1- 
Given the lemons discount, firms  will choose to issue shares  only when 
(A.8)  At  '  I + Qt 
so that the supply-of-funds  schedule  facing the firm  has a discontinuity 
at the point  where retentions  are exhausted. 
APPENDIX  B 
Data Base  and Variables 
OUR  DATA SAMPLE  was the annual  Value Line data  base, updated  in April 
1986.  The data  cover manufacturing  firms  (two-digit  SIC codes between 
20 and  39, inclusive). Firms  were included  in the sample  only if they had 
observations  for each year from 1969  through  1984.  The 1969  data  were 
used only for constructing  lags. We used earlier  data, when available,  to 
construct  longer lags for some of the tests described in tables 4 and 5. 
We chose 1969  as the starting  point  because inventory  data  necessary  to 
construct the Q variable were available only from 1969 onward. We 
excluded 1985  because the number  of firms  with observations in 1985 
dropped  substantially. 
Firms  that  had  mergers  valued  at more  than 10  percent  of their  capital 
stock were excluded from the sample  because large mergers  could lead 
to inconsistencies  when constructing  the ratios  used in the regressions. 
Merger  data  were taken  from  the COMPUSTAT  data  base. The merger 
deletions  occurred  almost  exclusively among  mature  firms,  and  they did 
not materially  affect the reported results. Several observations were 
deleted because of missing data for individual  variables  necessary for 
the regressions. Three firms were deleted because of major  inconsis- 
tencies between  their  capital stock  and  investment  data.  Two firms  were 
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the third  class, because of substantial  and frequent share repurchases 
that functioned  like dividends. Share repurchases  in the remainder  of 
the first class firms  were zero or negligible.  Further  details concerning 
the data  are available  from  the authors. 
Market  value  of  equity  (V).  The value of common stock at the 
beginning  of the year is the average  price over the last fiscal quarter  of 
the previous year times the number  of shares  outstanding  at the end of 
the previous  fiscal  year. For  the preferred  stock, we compute  the market 
value by dividing  preferred  dividends  by the preferred  stock yield from 
Standard  and  Poor's. 
Value of debt (B). The results  in the text are based on the book value 
of short-term  and long-term debt. We also considered the effect of 
estimating  the market  value of long-term  debt as follows. Value Line 
data  provide  the interest  paid  on long-term  debt. The  ratio  of this variable 
to the book value of long-term debt gives an estimate of the debt's 
average coupon raie (r,). To avoid the effect of outliers, this ratio was 
limited at a 10 percent premium  over the Baa corporate bond rate. 
Following Michael Salinger  and Lawrence Summers, we assumed all 
long-term  debt carries a Baa rating.56  Then the market  value of long- 
term debt can be estimated by [(1 + rBaa)/(l + rc)]M  times the book value, 
where  rBaa  is the market  rate on Baa debt and M is the average  time to 
maturity  of the existing debt. We made  this adjustment  for M values of 
5, 10, 15,  and  20 years, reflecting  the fact that  the maturity  of outstanding 
debt across our retention classes is likely different. None of these 
calculations,  however, changed  the pattern  of the reported  Q values or 
regression  results for any of the M values, relative to the results with 
book values presented  in the text. 
We also considered the possibility that the debt of firms  in the first 
class was more risky than Baa debt, in which case the adjustments 
described  above would overstate the value of debt in class 1 and could 
bias the q measurements upward. We assumed that any difference 
between r(.  and rBaa  was a risk premium,  and computed  q with the debt 
discounted  accordingly.  Again, this modification  produced  virtually  no 
difference  in the statistics  relative  to the book-value  calculations. 
56. Michael  A. Salinger  and Lawrence H. Summers,  "Tax Reform  and Corporate 
Investment:  A Microeconomic  Simulation  Study," in Martin  Feldstein, ed., Behavioral 
Simulation  Methods  in  Tax Policy  Analysis  (University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 
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Replacement  value of the capital stock (K).  K, represents the capital 
stock at the beginning  of period t. The replacement  value of property, 
plant, and equipment  is estimated from book values using a method 
similar  to that  of Salinger  and Summers.  We set the initial  value of K to 
the value of net plant  (adjusted  to market  value with aggregate  data)  for 
the first  year the firm  appears  on the Value Line data base. The capital 
stock is then defined  iteratively  as 
Kt =  [It +  (P,/Pt -1) Kt -1] (1-1/LIFE), 
where  Pt  is the implicit  price  deflator  for  fixed  nonresidential  investment, 
It is the firm's capital spending, and LIFE is the average service life 
implicit  in the firm's  book depreciation  costs. The final  term  is based on 
the assumption  that economic depreciation  is single-declining  balance. 
Our results did not change substantially  when we assumed double- 
declining  balance  economic depreciation.  For mature  firms,  the starting 
point for this procedure  generally  stretched  back to the late 1950s. For 
newer firms, the initial book value of their capital stock probably  is a 
good estimate  of its replacement  cost. Thus, the capital  stock estimates 
should  exhibit  little inflationary  bias for our sample  that  begins  in 1969. 
Tax  parametersfor Q. As in Salinger  and Summers,  we assume that 
tax policy parameters  remain  constant, and that  the sum  of the required 
rates of return  on investment  and expected inflation  is equivalent  to the 
nominal  Baa bond rate  plus 0.06. That  is, we let 
Xt  =  T  Z 
I  0 ] 
where  T represents  the corporate  income  tax rate, an  represents  inflation, 
and  Kt  is the nominal  replacement  value of the capital  stock and 
Tax depreciation is assumed to be double-declining  balance at rate 
8 = 2/LIFE.  The average  effective tax rate on dividends  (0) and capital 
gains (c) are taken from James Poterba.s7  The corporate  tax rate  T was 
set at the statutory  maximum  marginal  rate. 
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Market value of inventories (N).  Because  inventories are included in 
the market  valuation  of the firm,  but not in the replacement  cost of the 
fixed capital stock, we subtract  N from the market  value of the firm. 
There was no substantial  difference  in the results when N was instead 
added  to the replacement  cost of the firm's  capital  stock. Inventories  for 
each firm are converted from book value to market value using the 
procedure outlined in Salinger and Summers and Value Line data 
concerning  whether  the firm  uses LIFO and  FIFO methods  of inventory 
accounting. 
Investment  tax  credit  (k).  Information  on  legislated  values  of  the 
investment  tax credit  was taken  from  the Washington  University  Macro 
Model. Information  on the mix between equipment  and structure  was 
taken  from  aggregate  data. 
Cash flow (CF).  Cash  flow, as defined  by Value Line, equals  income 
after interest and taxes,  plus all noncash deductions from income 
(principally  depreciation  allowances  and  amortization).  Dividends  were 
not subtracted  from  cash flow. 
Q definitions. Using these components, we have constructed  three 
Q measures: 
Tobin's q =  (V + B -  N)IK; 
Tax-adjusted  Q =  (I -  T)-  K  -(1-  k-  TZ);  and 
(no dividends  paid)  V- 
Tax-adjusted  Q = (1 - LT)  (  vx  B  (1  _-  k(-  TZ) 
(dividends paid)  L 
K  K 
Cost of capital (r). The cost of capital is given by 
r 
=  L  )  i  +  0  - T)iL  Te+a 
where 
Pk  =  implicit  price deflator  for capital  goods 
p  =  implicit  price deflator  for nonfarm  business output 
T  =corporate  income tax rate 
k =  investment tax credit rate Steven  M. Fazzari,  R.  Glenn Hubbard,  anid Bruce  C. Petersen  195 
z =  present  value of one dollar  of depreciation  allowances 
o =  marginal  effective personal  tax rate  on dividend  income 
c  =  marginal  effective personal  tax rate on capital  gains 
L =  average  proportion  of marginal  investment  financed  with debt 
i  =  average  nominal  Baa corporate  bond rate 
,e=  expected  inflation rate 
8  =  economic depreciation  rate. Comments 
and Discussion 
Alan S. Blinder:  A few years ago, in revising my graduate course 
reading  list, I looked for some modern  literature  on liquidity  constraints 
and  investment  analogous  to the  burgeoning  literature  on liquidity  effects 
on consumption.  There was none. Now there is, thanks  to the sterling 
efforts  of Steven Fazzari,  Glenn  Hubbard,  and Bruce Petersen. So, lest 
what  I have to say sound  critical,  I want  to state clearly  that  the potential 
effects of cash flow on investment  was a research  question  crying  out to 
be asked theoretically  and then answered  empirically.  The authors, in 
this  paper  and  its predecessor,  attempt  to do both. For  that,  they deserve 
credit, maybe  even cash. 
Empirically,  there are striking  parallels between consumption  and 
investment.  As we all know, consumption  seems to respond  strongly  to 
current  income and  weakly, if at all, to interest  rates. The stylized  facts 
from business investment equations are much the same: a strong re- 
sponse to sales or output and a weak response to the cost of capital. 
These four  econometric  findings  pose challenges  to economic theory. 
I start  with income sensitivities, since they are most germane  to the 
authors' work. Milton Friedman and Franco Modigliani suggested 
decades ago that if consumption decisions arise from intertemporal 
optimization,  then current  income should have little effect on current 
consumption.  Yet the observed effect is strong. Modern  consumption 
theorists append rational expectations to  the  Friedman-Modigliani 
framework  and offer two explanations:  the theory is right, but current 
income is an excellent predictor  of future  income; the theory is wrong, 
perhaps  because of liquidity  constraints. 
In the case of investment, the empirical  puzzle runs deeper and the 
explanations  run  shallower.  Basic neoclassical  theory  denies any role to 
current  output;  only relative factor prices should drive investment. As 
economists realized  in the 1950s,  but forced themselves to forget in the 
196 Steven  M. Fazzari,  R.  Glenn Hubbard,  and Brutce C. Peter'sen  197 
1960s and 1970s, liquidity constraints offer one possible explanation: 
short-run  fluctuations  of GNP have large  effects on cash flow, which is 
a cheaper source of finance  than external  funds. The authors  resurrect 
this 1950s  view, but  rationalize  it not by transactions  costs-though  they 
do mention  them-but  rather  by 1980s-style  theorizing  based on infor- 
mational  asymmetries.  I like this line of theorizing,  though  I think  there 
is a tendency  to carry  it too far. For example, were most capital  markets 
closed to Steven Jobs in 1975  because of the lemons problem,  or was it 
because the risk  was so great?  Similarly,  did General  Motors  finance  its 
recent multibillion  dollar  investment  campaign  so easily because infor- 
mation  was symmetric  or because its pockets were so deep? We should 
insist on evidence that informational  problems are more important  in 
practice  than simpler  explanations  like transactions  costs. 
Now, what of interest  rates?  It is by now widely agreed  that saving  is 
not sensitive to rates of return.  The standard  explanation  is that  income 
effects cancel substitution  effects. This explanation,  of course, will not 
do for  investment  because  profit  maximization  precludes  income  effects. 
Yet the stylized fact is much the same: you have to torture the data 
pretty ruthlessly  before they confess to an interest elasticity of invest- 
ment. Why?  One possibility  is that business managers  do not maximize 
profits.  I return  to that  heresy at the end of my comments. 
The authors' explanation  is, once again, the financing  hierarchy.  If 
the marginal  cost of funds looks like a staircase  with narrow  treads  and 
big risers (see the authors' figure 1), then many firms will find their 
optimum  on the risers  rather  than  on the treads.  For such  firms,  a vertical 
upward  or downward  shift  of the whole staircase  (a change  in the cost of 
capital)  will have no effect on investment,  but  a widening  of the relevant 
tread  (a change  in credit  availability)  will change  investment.  Obviously, 
the story  is more  important  empirically  when  the risers  are  tall  than  when 
they are short (again, see figure 1). In the authors'  theory, the heights 
depend on the severity of informational  asymmetries.  In a more naive 
theory, they depend  on transactions  costs. 
Although the model favored by the authors is consistent with the 
stylized facts, it is not the only possible explanation.  Matthew  Shapiro 
offered a different  explanation  for these same facts two years ago at a 
meeting  of this  panel.  I  His was that  frequent,  large  shocks  to productivity 
1.  Matthew D. Shapiro, "Investment,  Output, and the Cost of Capital," BPEA, 1:1986, 
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simultaneously  raise output,  investment,  and interest  rates. As I recall, 
Shapiro  was all but hooted out of the room-Washington being too far 
from  the Great  Lakes to make  his story  believable,  especially  in a crowd 
more favorably disposed toward liquidity constraints. But we should 
still insist on empirical  evidence. 
Fazzari, Hubbard,  and Petersen  provide  some. Their  basic empirical 
idea is a good one. To see whether  investment spending  is sensitive to 
cash flow, they try to identify, on a priori  grounds,  the firms  most likely 
to encounter liquidity  constraints. They suggest dividend behavior as 
the telltale sign:  firms  with very low dividend  payout  rates are arguably 
more likely to be liquidity constrained than firms with more normal 
payout rates. I understand  the argument.  But it makes me a bit uneasy 
because it is so puzzling that firms pay any dividends at all. It takes 
exceedingly clever theoretical  arguments  to rationalize  this apparently 
irrational  behavior. 
I also have an econometric  source of unease. Dividend  payout rates 
are endogenous  and, in particular,  are probably  sensitive to unobserved 
investment  prospects. The authors'  basic regression  is: 
(1)  I/K  =  aQ  +  b (Cashflow/K)  +  u. 
Firms  that  draw  large  positive u's will probably  choose low payouts and 
hence wind up in classes 1 and 2 while firms  with large  negative u's will 
wind  up in class 3. That  starts  to sound  like truncating  on the error  term. 
I'm only a good enough econometrician  to worry about that problem, 
not to figure  out whether  including  fixed effects, as the authors  do, takes 
care of it. 
It seems to me that there are other ways to divide the sample-old 
versus young firms or small versus large ones-that  are freer of this 
problem  and  relate  better  to the information-based  theories  to which the 
authors  appeal.  Of course, these attributes  are correlated  with dividend 
policy; so perhaps the results would look much the same. However, 
dividend  policy, age, and  size are  not  perfectly  correlated;  so alternatives 
are perhaps  worth  exploring. 
Dividing  the sample  in different  ways has one further  virtue.  As I have 
noted, the financing  staircase  can  arise  from  several  sources.  The  lemons 
explanation  that the authors  favor suggests that young  versus old might 
be the key distinction.  Theories based on deep versus shallow pockets 
or on fixed  flotation  costs suggest  that small  versus large  may be the key 
distinction. Steven  M. Fazzari,  R.  Glenn Hubbard,  and Bruce  C. Petersen  199 
The results the authors  obtain are stunningly  strong  and important. 
In regressions  like equation 1, estimates of b are large and significant, 
even though very small firms and start-ups  are not in the Value Line 
sample. In fact, the results are too  strong and too  robust. Cash flow 
seems to affect investment  strongly  even in class 3 firms,  which have an 
average 1984  capital stock of $2 billion and an average payout rate of 
about  40 percent. Look, for example, at table  4, which uses the authors' 
favorite  theory, the Q theory. The equation  for the full period  says that, 
at the margin, a one dollar increase in cash flow raises investment 
spending  by 23 cents. That's a lot. Can  we really  believe that lending  to 
one of these billion-dollar  firms  is like buying  a used car  from  a stranger? 
I know I'd rather  buy a used bond from Chrysler  than a used Chrysler 
from  Bond. 
Here is a second problem. It seems to me that the staircase theory 
argues  not only that  cash flow should  be more  important  in classes 1 and 
2, which the authors always find, but also that cost of capital effects 
should  be less important.  In table 4, this is not true: Q matters  most in 
class 2. And in table 8, the Jorgenson  term matters  most in class 1 and 
least in class 3. 
Finally, let me say something  about the most boring  issue in macro- 
economics: stock versus flows. It seems to me that  liquidity  constraints 
should  pertain  to stocks, not to flows. I can understand  why a firm  with 
limited access to external capital might find its holdings of physical 
capital  constrained  by internal  funds. But I have a hard  time  understand- 
ing how a low current  cash flow could constrain  the net acquisition  of 
capital by a firm  with a large accumulated  stock of cash. Yet table 10 
shows that cash flows matter more than cash stocks and that adding 
stocks does not reduce  the coefficients  of cash flow very much. 
I can think  of two possible explanations.  The first  is that  the equation 
is misspecified:  it should  relate the desired capital stock to cash stocks 
and  append  an adjustment  mechanism  through  which  current  cash flows 
influence  the adjustment  of actual  to desired  capital.  The second is that 
the constraining  variable  for current  investment  is actually  opening  cash 
stock  plus current  cash flow, and  cash flows are  bigger  and  more  variable 
than  opening  stocks, so they dominate  econometrically.  I have no idea 
if either  of these explanations  holds water. 
One last remark.  At the end of their paper, the authors  dismiss the 
'managerial waste" hypothesis: that managers invest internal funds 
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lightly. Perhaps  managers  of large  firms  treat internal  funds as costless 
and  hate to go to the market.  How else are we to explain  the influence  of 
cash flow on the investment  of billion-dollar  firms?  Maybe  managers  are 
like mountain  climbers:  they invest the money "because it is there." 
That, I suppose, is what Carl Icahn and Boone Pickens believe. They 
are certainly  rich. Maybe  they are also smart. 
James M. Poterba:  Empirical  comparisons  between the simple accel- 
erator, neoclassical accelerator, Q theory, and cash flow models of 
aggregate  U.S. investment  have usually  favored the simple  accelerator 
specification. Nevertheless, textbook and classroom expositions of 
business investment  tend to rely on either the neoclassical accelerator 
or Q model, since they can be grounded  more formally in economic 
theory. This provocative  and important  paper seeks to change the way 
we think  about  the investment  function  in two ways. First, it marshals  a 
convincing  theoretical  case based  on credit  market  imperfections  for the 
proposition  that cash flow may significantly  affect investment  outlays. 
Economic theory suggests many reasons why firms  may be cash con- 
strained  when making  investment  outlays. Second, after removing  the 
central  obstacle to the respectability  of the cash flow model, the paper 
shows that cash flow variables substantially  improve the explanatory 
power  of investment  equations  estimated  using  individual  firm  data.  The 
paper  breaks  new ground  in explicitly  modeling  firm  heterogeneity  with 
respect to investment  rules and in demonstrating  that cash flow plays a 
more important  role in investment decisions of small firms  that retain 
most of their  earnings. 
There is more to compliment  than to quarrel  with in this paper. My 
comments will reflect this, focusing on three questions that arise in 
evaluating  the paper.  First, is the link  between  cash flow  and  investment 
operative  primarily  for low-dividend  firms,  or is it likely to be significant 
for mature firms as well? Second, do the paper's empirical results 
significantly  sharpen  our  knowledge  of how  cash  flow  affects  investment? 
Third, how well do the present results, for a sample of manufacturing 
firms, extrapolate to  the economy at large? I  shall consider these 
questions  in turn. 
The authors  are undoubtedly  correct  in arguing  that some small,  low- 
dividend  firms  face cash flow constraints  when undertaking  new invest- 
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the paper's empirical  results confirm)  the potential  importance  of cash 
flow. Several strands  of prior  evidence buttress  the view that cash flow 
may be more influential  for large firms than the authors claim. First, 
mature  dividend-paying  firms  cannot costlessly reduce their  dividends. 
Share  prices fall when firms  cut their dividends:  the most recent study 
shows a 2 percent  decline  in prices when a firm  reduces  its dividend,  and 
an 8 percent decline if a firm  completely omits a dividend.1  For a firm 
with a dividend  yield of 4 percent  a year, omitting  the dividend  for a one- 
year period  will reduce share  values by twice as much as the increment 
to investment  funds. This suggests  significant  costs to dividend  cuts, but 
it may also place an upper  bound  on the potential  cost of external  funds 
for mature firms. Anecdotal evidence also suggests the difficulty of 
dividend reduction. In 1968 when General Utilities tried to omit its 
dividends to finance investment projects, shareholders  protested vio- 
lently and eventually the management  agreed to continue the dividend 
and  resort  to external  finance.2 
Second, previous empirical  studies of rates of return  are consistent 
with the view that internal finance is perceived as less  costly than 
external  funds.3  Ex post profit  rates  are  higher  for firms  that  use external 
finance,  particularly  external  equity, than  for firms  that  rely on internal 
finance. These results are difficult  to interpret  because they may dem- 
onstrate only that firms with good earnings prospects can convince 
investors of their favorable future returns, but they are nevertheless 
consistent with this paper's results. They are not restricted to small 
firms, althought  it might be interesting  to reexamine the earlier tests 
using  the type of firm  stratification  rule  developed in the present  paper. 
Third, the asymmetric information  problems that are invoked to 
explain  credit  market  failures  for small  firms  appear  to affect both large 
and small firms. The voluminous literature on the valuation conse- 
quences of changes in capital structure, finding positive returns to 
transactions  that add debt or replace equity with debt, and negative 
1.  Kenneth  M. Eades,  Patrick J. Hess,  and E.  Han Kim,  "Market Rationality  and 
Dividend Announcements,"  Joulrnial  of Financial  Economics,  vol.  14 (December  1985), 
pp. 581-604. 
2.  "A Case for Dropping Dividends,"  Fortune, June 15, 1968. p. 18  1. 
3.  References  to this literature, and some  constructive  empirical evidence,  may be 
found in Alan J. Auerbach,  "Taxes,  Firm Financial Policy  and the Cost of Capital: An 
Empirical  Analysis,"  Jour)nal  of  Plublic Economics,  vol.  23  (February-March  1984), 
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returns for equity issues,  shows that firms are affected across size 
categories. Of course, it may be that if  significant  capital structure 
changes  were observed  for smaller  firms,  the valuation  effects would  be 
even larger than those for mature firms. This evidence nevertheless 
suggests  the potential  importance  of imperfect  information  even for  large 
firms. 
While the a priori case for believing this paper's central theme is 
strong, that does not simplify  the task of determining  how much  invest- 
ment  results  from  shocks to corporate  cash flow. That  must  be answered 
on the basis of the empirical  results, where some caution is required. 
The authors report investment equations for three groups of firms 
stratified  on the basis of dividend  payout  and show that  the link  between 
investment  and cash flow is substantially  stronger  for low-payout  than 
for high-payout  firms, even after controlling  for Tobin's q. The key 
question is whether shocks to cash flow are transmitted  to investment 
outlays, or whether  other  uses of funds, such as repurchasing  shares  or 
buying back or issuing debt, serve as shock absorbers  when earnings 
fluctuate. 
Earlier studies of investment and cash flow were dismissed partly 
because shocks to cash flow signal two things: an increase in current 
liquidity  and  a potential  improvement  in future  profitability.  The present 
paper  is much  more  careful  about  this  problem  than  previous  investment 
studies. By controlling  for the beginning-of-year  value of Tobin's q, the 
investment  equations  reduce the informational  content of current  cash 
flow. They do not eliminate it, however, and this clouds the results. 
There  are  many  reasons  for suspecting  that  measured  Q  is not a sufficient 
statistic  for future  cash flows. These range  from  difficulties  in measuring 
the replacement cost of the firm's assets,  to concern over whether 
average Q is a good proxy for marginal Q, to questions about the 
informational  content of stock prices themselves. If for any of these 
reasons the measured  Q variable  provides an error-ridden  indicator  of 
the firm's  true  prospects, then econometric  results  may  find  that  current 
cash flow affects investment only because this variable,  just like mea- 
sured Q, is correlated  with the "true" marginal  Q variable  that firms 
consider in making  investment  decisions. The pattern  of results across 
different  classes of firms  could be explained  on this view because Q is 
measured  with more error for smaller firms, which tend to be lower- 
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allude to instrumental  variable results where the current cash flow 
variable  is treated  as endogenous. These results are unfortunately  not 
reported,  even though  they are easier to interpret  than  the ordinary  least 
squares estimates. Similarly, the authors mention but do not report 
equations  including  Tobin's q from  the end of the current  period  as well 
as the end of the previous  period.  The coefficients  on cash flow in these 
equations  are somewhat  cleaner than those from the models with only 
lagged  Q, since they avoid  biases that  result  when  cash flow  incorporates 
later  information  than  the Q variable. 
One  particular  source  of error  that  illustrates  these problems  concerns 
tax losses. Although the paper uses microeconomic  data, the authors 
assume that all firms  face identical tax parameters.  In practice, some 
firms  have tax loss carryforwards  that  prevent  them  from  taking  advan- 
tage of the investment tax credit and depreciation  allowances that are 
available  to the "representative  firm.  " For  tax loss firms,  the assumption 
that they can claim full tax benefits induces a measurement  error  in Q. 
Moreover,  since a firm's  current  cash flow is almost  certainly  correlated 
with its tax status, the measurement  error is correlated  with the cash 
flow variable.  A standard  errors-in-variables  argument  could therefore 
account  for the cash flow coefficients. Instrumental  variables  estimates 
using the lagged value of Q, or equations that ignore the tax factors 
completely, may fail to remedy these problems. Further  work, with 
more  explicit  modeling  of the measurement  error  dynamics,  would  help, 
since definitive support for credit market effects must resolve these 
issues. 
The  final  question  I consider  involves the authors'  efforts  to generalize 
their results. Within the  sample, approximately 1 percent of  total 
investment  was undertaken  by firms  in class 1, and another  2.3 percent 
by firms  in class 2. This understates  the importance  of cash flow factors 
as sources of investment fluctuation,  however, since the authors  cor- 
rectly  observe that  cash flow is more  variable  for their  class 1  and  2 firms 
than  for the mature  class 3 corporations.  The paper's  extrapolations  are 
probably  too sweeping, however. The paper  notes that over 20 percent 
of assets in manufacturing  are held by firms that are as small as, or 
smaller  than, the firms  in class 1. The trouble  with inferring  that  they all 
face tight borrowing constraints is that firms with traded equity (a 
precondition  for being in the sample)  may be a selected group  that has 
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may therefore  be difficult  to extrapolate  the results to the rest of the 
manufacturing  sector. 
It is even more difficult to generalize to nonnmanufacturing  firms, 
which held over 70 percent  of corporate  plant  and equipment  at the end 
of 1986. Some assets, such as cars, cash registers, and computers, can 
serve as collateral for bank loans. Firms that invest heavily in such 
standardized  assets probably face much easier hurdles on external 
finance than do more specialized manufacturing  firms that purchase 
unique  assets. Firms  outside  manufacturing  are  also likely to experience 
more stable cash flow: a 1 percent change in GNP translates  into more 
than a 2.2 percent change in manufacturing  output. This suggests that 
the cash flow  considerations  that  are  highlighted  here  may  be less central 
in other  parts  of the economy. Conclusions  about  the importance  of cash 
flow factors in these sectors must therefore await evidence on the 
behavior  of nonmanufacturing  firms. 
In testimony to the important  and provocative nature  of this paper, 
studies generalizing  the present  methodology  to other samples  of firms, 
in other industries  and other countries, have already  begun to appear. 
There is little doubt that future research on corporate  investment and 
capital markets more generally will have to reckon with the authors' 
revivification  of the cash flow model of capital  spending. 
General Discussion 
Some participants  discussed the reliability  of the authors'  empirical 
results. Elaborating  on Alan Blinder's comments, Christopher  Sims 
suggested that the authors  should have grouped  the firms  according  to 
some essentially  exogenous characteristic  such  as size or age rather  than 
by their  dividend-income  ratio. It is not sufficient  to argue  that all class 
1 firms are small or young, because a considerable  percentage of the 
small and young firms  might  be in classes 2 and 3. Even in that case a 
simultaneity  bias will remain. James Tobin noted that the firm  jointly 
determines  investment,  dividend  payments,  and  other  ways of allocating 
its cash flow. Therefore,  he suggested  that  the authors  model  investment 
and  dividends  as depending  on the same set of explanatory  variables. 
Sims went on to describe two other potential  pitfalls  of the authors' 
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to the firm about future profitability. Hence investment should be 
correlated  with  cash flow  even with  perfect  capital  markets.  The present 
results may simply  indicate  that the information  content of cash flow is 
greater  for class 1 firms,  which are almost all small  and young. Second, 
even in the absence of a correlation  between investment  opportunities 
and cash flow in the entire population  of firms, it is possible that the 
authors' method of classification will group together firms that, by 
chance, have cash flow roughly  equal  to their  investment  needs. 
William  Brainard  concurred  with Sims's argument,  observing  that  the 
typical  class 1  firm  is likely to have a low variance  of its dividend  payout 
ratio as well as a low average. Since dividends themselves tend to be 
infrequently  changed, most of the variation  in a firm's payout ratio is 
likely  to reflect  variations  in the denominator,  its earnings.  High  earnings 
variability  presumably  reduces the information  content of current  earn- 
ings for the profitability  of investment. Hence the firms  excluded from 
class 1 would be expected to have a lower correlation  of cash flow and 
investment,  even with  perfect  capital  markets.  Joseph  Stiglitz  suggested 
a more powerful method to test for the importance  of the cash flow 
constraint.  If the cash  flow  constraint  is actually  binding,  then  one should 
find  a clustering  of investment  levels around  the constraint.  On  the other 
hand, if investment  is far away from the constraint,  then it is likely that 
a significant  coefficient  on cash flow is spurious. 
Robert  Hall was generally skeptical  about the progress  of empirical 
work  on investment.  He noted  that  most  investment  equations,  including 
his own earlier  work with Jorgenson  and the present equations of the 
authors,  suffer  from an identification  problem.  Because the right-hand- 
side variables  are invariably  endogenous, there is no way to determine 
what  is driving  what. 
Discussion turned  to Blinder's  question  of why cash flow rather  than 
the stock of cash is the relevant  variable  for investment  equations. It is 
difficult  to argue  that a firm  with low cash flow is constrained  if it holds 
substantial  liquid  assets. James Poterba  noted that a firm  that builds  up 
large stocks of cash for future  investments  is considered  a cash cow: a 
prime target  for takeovers. A firm  may therefore soak up excess cash 
flow by investing incrementally  rather  than acquiring  stocks of cash. 
This would tend to make investment  more highly correlated  with cash 
flow than with stocks of cash. Stiglitz suggested that the liquidity  of a 
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alternative  explanation  of why the stock of cash has little explanatory 
power  in  cross-sectional  investment  equations  even if  finance  constraints 
are important.  Stiglitz  also noted that  for a variety  of reasons  firms  may 
want  to maintain  a certain  ratio  of capital  to cash on their  balance  sheet. 
Thus the stock of cash may actually  increase  with investment,  contrary 
to what  would be expected in a liquidity-constrained  world. 
Stiglitz  noted  that  imperfect  information  is a key reason  for  constraints 
on external  financing,  for both large  and small  firms.  Therefore  he was 
not surprised  by the economically  significant  cash flow  coefficients  even 
for the larger  class 3 firms. Ben Bernanke  drew parallels  between the 
authors' work and earlier  work of Feldstein and Horioka, who found 
that for smaller  countries investment  often equals savings. Thus small 
countries,  as well as small  corporations,  apparently  face external  finance 
constraints. 